Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of Creditors\u27 Rights by Sherman, Jeffrey G.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 55 | Issue 2 Article 2
Winter 1979
Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The
Problem of Creditors' Rights
Jeffrey G. Sherman
Chicago-Kent College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sherman, Jeffrey G. (1979) "Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of Creditors' Rights," Indiana Law Journal: Vol.
55 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol55/iss2/2
Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The




Most pension plans' that employers maintain to provide their
employees with retirement benefits are funded2 by means of trusts.3
Typically, the plan will call for the employer (and sometimes the
participating employees as well) to make periodic contributions to
the trust; the trustee will thereupon invest the contributions and,
as each participant retires or otherwise becomes eligible for a bene-
fit, make distributions to him from the trust in accordance with the
plan's provisions. Since the interest of a trust beneficiary is gener-
ally regarded as a property right and liable for the beneficiary's
debts. along with his legal interests, 4 unless exempted by direction
of the settlor or by statute, there is a danger that funds in a pension
t Copyright 1980 by Jeffrey G. Sherman. All rights reserved.
* A.B. 1968; J.D. 1972, Harvard. Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technol-
ogy, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.), defines the
term "pension plan" as
any plan, fund, or program ... established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express terms
or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program-
(A) provides retirement income to employees, or
(B) ' results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond ....
Id. § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976). This definition is employed throughout this article.
2 That the word "fund" (along with "parent") should have become a verb is one of the
barbarisms of our age. This use of the word has, however, become so deeply ingrained among
pension practitioners that no attempt will be made herein to avoid it. In the context of
pension law the "funding medium" of a plan is the entity that serves to receive contributions
and make benefit payments.
I Other funding media that may be used include retirement bonds, group annuity contracts
and custodial accounts. See generally A. CoLLiNs, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFrrs §§ 5.02[9], 5.03[8] (1978), which describes the kinds of arrangements that may
be used to fund plans that qualify for favorable tax treatment pursuant to I.R.C. § 401(a).
As of 1970, 79% of collectively-bargained-for multi-employer pension plans and 69% of all
other pension plans were funded by means of trusts rather than insurance or annuity con-
tracts. EMPLOYEE BENEFrrS FACrBOOK 465 (1972).
1 G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 193 (2d ed. 1965).
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trust 5 intended to be made available to a participant at retirement
may long since have been appropriated by his creditors.
Section 206(d)6 of ERISA is Congress' response to this problem.
In order to ensure that the benefits that have accrued to a partici-
pant are available to him at retirement, 7 every pension plan (with
certain unimportant exceptions8) is now required to prohibit the
assignment or alienation of plan benefits.9 In addition, ERISA
amended the Internal Revenue Code0 to impose a similar require-
ment on all pension plans intended to be "qualified"'" pursuant to
A pension trust is the trust by means of which a pension plan is funded.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1976).
H.R. REP. No. 807, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 68, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4670, 4734.
'This provision of ERISA applies to all pension plans established or maintained by any
employer or by any employee organization or organizations representing employees, where
such employer or organization engages in commerce (that is, trade between any State and
any place outside thereof) or in an activity affecting commerce, with the exception of the
following kinds of plans:
(1) Governmental plans (as defined in ERISA § 3(32), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)
(1976));
(2) Certain church plans (as defined in ERISA § 3(33), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)
(1976));
(3) Plans maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable
workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability in-
surance laws;
(4) Plans maintained outside of the United States primarily for the benefit of
persons substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens;
(5) Excess benefit plans (as defined in ERISA § 3(36), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36)
(1976));
(6) Employee welfare benefit plans (as defined in ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(1) (1976));
(7) Plans which are unfunded and are maintained by an employer primarily
for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of manage-
ment or highly compensated employees;
(8) Plans established and maintained by a society, order, or association de-
scribed in I.R.C. § 501(c)(8) or (9), if no part of the contributions to or under
such plans are made by employers of participants in such plans;
(9) Trusts described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(18);
(10) Plans which are established and maintained by a labor organization
described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) and which do not at any time after September
2, 1974, provide for employer contributions;
(11) Agreements providing payments to a retired partner or a deceased part-
ner's successor in interest, as described in I.R.C. § 736; and
(12) Individual retirement accounts or annuities described in I.R.C. § 408, or
individual retirement bonds described in I.R.C. § 409.
ERISA 99 3(11), 4, 201, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(11), 1003, 1051 (1976).
1 Prior to the enactment of ERISA, there was no requirement that pension plans contain
spendthrift provisions. See Rev. Rul. 56-432, 1956-2 C.B. 284.
," The amendment was effected by ERISA § 1021(c), which added § 401(a)(13) to the
Internal Revenue Code.
" The tax advantages obtained when a pension plan is qualified include the following:
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I.R.C. § 401(a), whether or not such plans are covered by ERISA §
206(d).12
Section 206(d) of ERISA provides:
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided
under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection,
there shall not be taken into account any voluntary and revoca-
ble assignment of not to exceed 10 percent of any benefit pay-
ment, or of any irrevocable assignment or alienation of benefits,
executed before the date of enactment of this Act. The preced-
ing sentence shall not apply to any assignment or alienation
made for the purpose of defraying plan administration costs. For
purposes of this paragraph a loan made to a participant or bene-
ficiary shall not be treated as an assignment or alienation if such
loan is secured by the participant's accrued nonforfeitable bene-
fit and is exempt from the tax imposed by Section 4975 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to tax on prohibited
transactions) by reason of Section 4975(d)(1) of such Code.
The language of I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) is essentially identical. 3
(1) Contributions to the plan by the employer are currently deductible by the
employer whether or not any participating employee obtains a nonforfeitable
right to that contribution at the time it is made. I.R.C. § 404.
(2) The employer contributions are not included in the gross income of any
participating employee until actually distributed or made available to him, even
though he may have obtained a nonforfeitable right to those contributions prior
to distribution or availability. I.R.C. § 402.
(3) On the death of a participating employee his interest in the plan payable
to a named beneficiary will be exempt from estate tax to the extent such interest
is attributable to" employer contributions, unless the distribution receives the
favorable income tax treatment accorded lump sum distributions. I.R.C. §
2039(c).
(4) The trust by means of which the plan is funded is exempt from income
tax. I.R.C. § 501(a).
£2 It is expected that most pension plans will be subject to both ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d) and I.R.C. § 401(a)(13). Each of the provisions, however, carries with it different
penalties for violation. See note 13 infra.
The Internal Revenue Code speaks of the trust, rather than the plan, as being "qualified,"
although some of the requirements for the trust's qualification are imposed upon the plan
rather than the trust. For example, in order for the trust to be qualified, the trust must meet
the requirement of I.R.C. § 401(a)(2), and the plan of which such trust is a part must meet
the requirement of I.R.C. § 401(a)(3). Nonetheless, it is customary to speak of the plan, rather
than the trust, as being qualified, see, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a) (1963); Rev. Rul. 73-534,
1973-2 C.B. 132, and this usage is adopted herein.
Title I of ERISA, on the other hand, by its terms imposes requirements upon only plans,
not upon trusts.
11 The legislative history of ERISA reveals that Congress' original plan for correcting the
many abuses in the private pension system that had been brought to its attention during the
early 1970's was to amend Subchapter D of the Internal Revenue Code to augment the body
of requirements that a plan had to meet in order to obtain the tax advantage of qualification.
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This article will explore the ramifications of ERISA § 206(d) and
I.R.C. § 401(a)(13), which purport to make every pension trust a
spendthrift trust." In order to understand how these provisions will
operate, however, it is first necessary to review the means whereby,
in the absence of spendthrift restrictions, a creditor may satisfy a
debt out of the interest his debtor may have in a trust.
Creditor's Rights to Debtor's Trust Interest
In general, the creditor of a trust beneficiary may proceed in
equity to seek satisfaction of the beneficiary's debt.'5 Indeed, equita-
ble remedies are frequently the only relief available to such a credi-
tor.'" Typically, however, the creditor may not proceed in equity
until he has reduced his claim to judgment" and unless he can
establish that, because the debtor hasn't enough property of his own
Since not all pension plans are intended to be qualified, however, Congress saw fit to incorpo-
rate these additional restrictions not only in the Internal Revenue Code, but also in what is
now Title I of ERISA-a new corpus of federal substantive law applicable to pension plans
whether qualified or not. See generally Chadwick & Foster, Federal Regulation of Retirement
Plans: The Quest for Parity, 28 VAND. L. REv. 641, 669 (1975). Thus, many of the requirements
imposed by ERISA appear in two places in the statute.
The provisions of Title I (which includes ERISA § 206(d)) are to be administered by the
Labor Department, ERISA §§ 505, 3(13), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1135, 1002(13) (1976), while the
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code are, obviously, to be administered by the Treasury
Department. In order to prevent any undue overlap of jurisdiction, however, the ERISA
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 transferred to the Treasury Department the exclusive
authority to issue rulings and regulations interpreting ERISA § 206(d) along with I.R.C. §
401(a)(13). Exec. Order No. 12,108, 44 Fed. Reg. 1065 (1978).
Although a plan might be subject only to the provisions of Title I and not to those of
Subchapter D of the Internal Revenue Code (e.g., a plan not intended to be qualified that is
maintained by an employer affecting interstate commerce) or be subject to the Internal
Revenue Code restrictions but not to those of Title I (e.g., a government plan intended to be
qualified), most plans in existence areprobably subject to both sets of restrictions. Thus, an
act or omission that constitutes a violation of I.R.C. § 401(a) (13) will generally be a violation
of ERISA § 206(d) as well. The penalties for violating each section are different, however. In
brief, a violation of any provision of I.R.C. § 401(a) with respect to a qualified plan brings
about adverse tax consequences to the employer, the participants, and the trust by means of
which the plan is funded; while a violation of a Title I provision will expose the plan or the
responsible plan fiduciaries to certain civil liability. See ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132
(1976).
" These requirements will be analyzed in the context of plans funded by means of trusts,
since the trust is the most common funding medium. See note 3 supra. But the requirements
still apply even if some other funding medium is used.
De Reusse v. Williams, 181 Iowa 379, 164 N.W. 896 (1917).
See Freedman's Say. & Trust Co. v. Earle, 110 U.S. 710, 712-13 (1884); Gardiner v.
Rogers, 267 Mass. 274, 166 N.E. 763 (1929); Mesce v. Gradone, 1 N.J. 159, 62 A.2d 394 (1948);
Noyes v. Noyes, 110 Vt. 511, 9 A.2d 123 (1939).
1' See Dunham v. Kauffman, 385 Ill. 79, 52 N.E.2d 143 (1943); Fuqua v. Trego, 47 N.M.
34, 133 P.2d 344 (1943).
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to satisfy the judgment, the creditor's legal remedies are inade-
quate. 8 The equity court may order that the beneficiary's interest
be sold to pay the debt" or, if the court considers it practicable and
more in the interests of the parties, may simply require that the
periodic trust distributions be applied, as they come due, to pay-
ment of the debt2 0
The judicial sale of a beneficiary's interest does not bring about
the termination of the trust as to that beneficiary or the transfer of
corpus to the purchaser. Rather, the purchaser at a judicial sale
steps into the shoes of the beneficiary, and his rights in the trust are
subject to the same restrictions and contingencies as the benefici-
ary's rights.2' He has no right to a distribution of trust property prior
to the time distribution would have been made to the beneficiary,2
and if the occurrence of a particular contingency would have de-
feated the beneficiary's interest, such occurrence will similarly de-
feat the purchaser's interest.m Thus, if, by the terms of a pension
plan, a participant was not entitled to a distribution of his interest
in the plan until he terminated his employment, an attaching credi-
tor or a purchaser on judicial sale would be obliged to wait until the
debtor terminated his employment before receiving anything from
the trust; and if the plan provided that a participant whose employ-
" W.S. Huselton & Co. v. Durie, 77 N.J. Eq. 437, 77 A. 1042 (1910); ILL. Ray. STAT. ch.
22, § 49 (1973); Omo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 2333.01 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-601 (1955).
11 See, e.g., Sefton v. San Diego Trust & Sav. Bank, 106 P.2d 974 (Cal. App. 1940).
See, e.g., Marshall's Trustee v. Rash, 87 Ky. 116, 119, 7 S.W. 879, 880 (1888).
Where the beneficiary has only a right to the income for life, the court may order
a sale of the life interest and payment to the creditor out of the proceeds. Since
such an interest is not readily salable at a fair price, this remedy may cause a
hardship to the beneficiary. Accordingly, if it appears that the debt can be
satisfied within a reasonable time from the income, the court will not order a
sale of the interest of the beneficiary, but will direct the trustee to pay the
income to the creditor until his claim is satisfied.
2 A. Sco-r, THE LAw OF TRUSTs § 147.2 (3d ed. 1967) (footnote omitted).
21 County Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sheppard, 136 Cal. App. 2d 205, 288 P.2d 880 (1955);
G. BOGERT, supra note 4, at § 188.
22 Vellacott v. Murphy, 16 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 767 (1927); Perabo v.
Gallagher, 241 Mass. 207, 135 N.E. 113 (1922); In re Hall's Estate, 248 Pa. 218, 93 A. 944
(1915); see Moser & Son v. Tucker & Co., 87 Tex. 94, 26 S.W. 1044 (1894). Where a life
insurance beneficiary irrevocably elects to receive insurance proceeds in monthly installments
over 20 years and where the proceeds were garnished by the beneficiary's creditor, the creditor
is entitled to the installments as they come due but not to lump sum satisfaction of the claim.
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Frost Nat'l Bank of San Antonio, 393 F. Supp. 204
(E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 516 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1975); Roth v. Kaptowsky,
401 Ill. 424, 82 N.E.2d 661 (1948). See note 24 infra.
2 In re Perkins' Will, 154 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sur. Ct. 1956); In re Orr's Estate, 192 Misc. 608,
81 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sur. Ct. 1948), aff'd without opinion, 275 App. Div. 702, 87 N.Y.S.2d 664,
aff'd without opinion, 300 N.Y. 571, 89 N.E.2d 527 (1949).
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ment terminated prior to the completion of, say, ten years of service
forfeited his entire interest in the trust, the debtor-participant's
termination of employment prior to completing that period of ser-
vice would defeat the interest of such creditor or purchaser.24
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The Scope of Preemption
Section 514(a) of ERISA2 provides in part that the provisions of
Title I of the statute "supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may . . . relate to any employee benefit plan," with certain
narrow exceptions not here pertinent.2 Clearly, the word "laws" in
this provision comprehends judicial decisional law as well as statu-
tory law,21 but what is meant by the word "relate"? Does ERISA
purport to preempt only state laws that by their express terms are
made applicable to employee benefit plans; or does the preemption
provision extend to all state laws that in fact have any effect on
plans? Let us consider a specific case. ERISA § 206(d), as we have
seen, requires all covered pension plans to contain a "spendthrift"
24 If the interest of a beneficiary is a contingent interest, the ability of his creditors to reach
it may depend on the remoteness of the contingency. Clarke v. Fay, 205 Mass. 228, 91 N.E.
328 (1910); see Moser & Son v. Tucker & Co., 87 Tex. 94, 26 S.W. 1044 (1894). Where a
contingency is particularly remote, "the price received at a forced sale would be so dispropor-
tionate to the value of the interest if it should vest that some courts at least have regarded
it as unfair to the beneficiary to permit his creditors to force a sale of it. The benefit to the
creditor would be small, since the price received would usually be merely nominal, and the
possible loss to the beneficiary would be great." 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 20, at § 162. There is
disagreement among courts, however, as to when that degree of remoteness is reached.
Compare Smith v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 149, 41 A. 284 (1898) (son's interest contingent on
surviving mother held not to be reachable by creditors) with Reilly v. Mackenzie, 151 Md.
216, 134 A. 502 (1926) (son's interest contingent on surviving mother held reachable by
creditors). Some courts, when faced with the problem of levying upon a contingent interest,
have employed the sensible expedient of declining to order a sale but granting the creditor a
lien against the interest and postponing the sale until such time as the interest vests. Mid-
America Corp. v. Geismar, 380 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1963); see Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis. 11, 258 N.W.
391 (1935).
Strictly speaking, the interest of the participating employee described in the accompanying
text would be classified as an equitable fee simple subject to defeasance. While there is a legal
difference between a contingent interest and a vested interest subject to defeasance, the
better view, in determining a creditor's rights in the interest, is to focus on the likelihood that
the debtor will come into possession, without regard to the technical classification of the
interest. Smith v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 149, 41 A. 284 (1898); Loeb v. Loeb, 261 Ind. 193, 301
N.E.2d 349 (1973). See generally Carey & Freeman, Alienation of Future Interests in Illi-
nois, 31 ILL. L. Rsv. 1, 13-14 (1936); Halbach, Creditors' Rights in Future Interests, 43 MINN.
L. REv. 217, 232-37 (1958).
1 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
21 The statutory exceptions involve state insurance, banking, and "generally applicable"
criminal laws. ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1976).
2 ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1976).
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provision so that an employee's accrued benefit under the plan can-
not be attached by his creditors.2 In a number of states, however,
spendthrift provisions are, for reasons of public policy, given no
effect by courts, so that the creditors of a trust beneficiary can
"1 Strictly speaking, ERISA § 206(d) and I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) require that plans by their
terms prohibit only "assignments" and "alienations." No mention is made of levies or attach-
ments by creditors. Thus, it could be claimed that a plan that prohibits voluntary alienations
by participants but permits involuntary alienations on behalf of participants' creditors com-
plies with ERISA. Indeed, one court so construed the statute, thus permitting a judgment
creditor of a participant to garnish the participant's pension benefits. National Bank of N.
America v. IBEW Local 3, 93 Misc. 2d 590, 400 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1977), aff'd, 69 App.
Div. 2d 679, 419 N.Y.S. 2d 127 (1979). The trial court's holding was based on a misreading of
the legislative history and on the fact that other federal statutes prohibiting the assignment
of benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1976) (veterans' benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976) (Social
Security benefits), also refer to levy or garnishment by creditors, whereas ERISA does not.
The legislative history on which the court focused was the following passage from the Joint
House and Senate Conference Committee Report:
Under the conference substitute, a plan must provide that benefits under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated. However, the plan may provide that after
a benefit is in pay status there may be a voluntary revocable assignment...
by an employee. . . . For purposes of this rule, a garnishment or levy is not to
be considered a voluntary assignment.
H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 280 (1974) (emphasis supplied). Contrary to what
the court found, the clear implication of the passage is that a garnishment or levy is prohib-
ited by the general rule to which the "voluntary revocable assignment" provision is an excep-
tion. Indeed, other courts seem simply to have assumed without discussion that ERISA §
206(d) was designed to preclude creditors from reaching pension plans assets. See Cody v.
Riecker, 454 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affl'd, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Stone v. Stone,
450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978).
Furthermore, as a matter of general common law, provisions in a private trust instrument
that purport to preclude voluntary alienation by a beneficiary are held to preclude involun-
tary alienation as well. Roberts v. Stevens, 84 Me. 325, 24 A. 873 (1892); Partridge v. Caven-
der, 96 Mo. 452, 9 S.W. 785 (1888); Winthrop Co. v. Clinton, 196 Pa. 472, 46 A. 435 (1900).
Contra, Koelliker v. Denkinger, 148 Kan. 503, 83 P.2d 703, modified on other grounds, 149
Kan. 259, 86 P.2d 740 (1938) (a statute, since completely altered, which by its terms made
certain trust interests nonalienable by beneficiaries was held nonetheless to permit creditors
to reach the interests).
Curiously, ERISA does not by its terms prohibit alienations; it merely requires that plans
prohibit them. Suppose an employer establishes a pension plan but does not include in the
plan instrument the required spendthrift language. Is a participant's creditor therefore able
to attach his interest under the plan, or does ERISA by its own force preclude attachments,
notwithstanding the absence of any spendthrift language in the plan? One is tempted to
suppose that ERISA does indeed by its own force preclude attachments. Otherwise, the only
recourse available to a participant whose creditor attached his interest would be an action
for damages against the plan sponsor for having omitted the required language, and it is
unlikely that ERISA would accord the participant such a cause of action. In view of the
legislative history of this provision, see note 7 supra, it is more reasonable to suppose that
Congress, rather than leaving such a participant without recourse, intended § 206(d) to
preclude attachments by its own force. (There are no cases in point, and search has revealed
no comparable statutes. Those other statutes designed to prohibit the alienation of benefits
or beneficial interests invariably do so by their own terms rather than by requiring some other
instrument to contain prohibitory language. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 26-601 to -604 (1955); WASH. REv. CODE § 6.32.250 (1978)).
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attach, and the beneficiary can assign, his interest under the trust,
notwithstanding the presence of a spendthrift provision in the trust
instrument. 9 Clearly, this state rule regarding spendthrift trusts
was not designed to deal with employee benefit plans, yet it does in
fact affect them. Is it preempted by ERISA?
If the question is answered in the negative-that is, if ERISA's
preemption provision is construed to be limited to state laws that
are expressly applicable to employee benefit plans, the trustee of a
qualified pension trust subject to, say, New Hampshire law could
find himself in a most awkward position. Suppose a creditor of an
employee participating in the pension plan obtains a judgment in
state court against the employee, and the employee's interest in the
trust is levied upon by an execution issued upon the judgment.
When the trustee receives the court order directing him to pay trust
assets over to the creditor, what is he to do? 3' To refuse to comply
with the order could result in a default judgment against the trustee
personally in favor of the creditor;2 but to pay over the funds as
ordered would violate ERISA § 206(d), and for such violation the
trustee might be held personally liable to make good the employee's
loss. 33 Moreover, a payment of plan assets to the judgment creditor
E.g., Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 A. 186 (1935); Chinnis v. Cobb, 210 N.C. 104,
185 S.E. 638 (1936) (spendthrift restrictions are enforced only if the trust complies with the
limitations set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (1976), among which is the requirement that
the trust be for the support and maintenance of a relative of the grantor); Industrial Nat'l
Bank v. Budlong, 106 R.I. 780, 264 A.2d 18 (1970).
11 Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 A. 186 (1935).
31 This particular conflict between a state and a federal rule might, of course, be resolved
simply by reference to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
See Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413 (1973) (holding that the federal
statute exempting Social Security benefit payments from creditors' claims took precedence,
because of the Supremacy Clause, over a New Jersey statutory scheme giving a county welfare
board a claim against the recipient's assets). However, because, for purposes of the analysis
to be set forth in this article, it is important to develop the concept of federal preemption
under ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), the discussion of the resolution of this
conflict will focus on the ERISA preemption provision rather than on the Supremacy Clause.
' See Olds Motor Works v. Berggren, 189 Minn. 639, 250 N.W. 567 (1933); Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Davis, 325 Pa. 328, 191 A. 2 (1937). But see Ray v. Peter Fox Sons Co., 272 Ky. 497,
114 S.W.2d 750 (1938). The matter is often governed by statute. In some jurisdictions the
proper remedy against the garnishee is a proceeding for contempt rather than a default
judgment. See Hibernia Say. & Loan Soc'y v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 265 (1880).
11 It is clear that the employee would have a cause of action pursuant to ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1976), but it is less clear whether the cause of action
would lie against the trustee personally or only against the plan. Actions authorized by
ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1976), however, may always be brought against the
trustee personally, and it appears that the employee would have a cause of action under this
section as well. Section 409(a) declares that a plan fiduciary can be held personally liable for
any losses resulting from a breach by the fiduciary of any of the duties imposed upon him by
Title I of ERISA. Among those duties is that of carrying out his responsibilities with respect
[Vol. 55:247
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would violate I.R.C. § 401(a) (13), and the plan would consequently
be disqualified."
Fortunately for the trustee, the legislative history suggests most
strongly that Congress intended to preempt all state laws that in
fact affect covered plans, whether or not those laws were expressly
made applicable to such plans. The bills from which ERISA evolved
generally limited the scope of preemption to state regulation of cer-
tain enumerated areas expressly covered by those bills.35 But such
to the plan "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar
as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter."
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1976). Since the plan document would
presumably contain the anti-assignment language of ERISA § 206(d), the trustee, by paying
funds to the attaching creditor, would indeed be carrying out his responsibilities in a manner
inconsistent with the plan document and hence would violate § 404(a)(1)(D), giving rise to
personal liability pursuant to § 409(a).
It is true that the language of § 409(a) suggests that the provision is limited to conduct
which affects the integrity of the plan as a whole, rather than conduct which affects an
individual participant's interest under the plan. Nonetheless, the language is susceptible of
the construction given it herein, and the Labor Department evidently so construes it. See
ERISA Enforcement Guide-Dept. of Labor [CCH] § 305.0 et seq. (1978). Search has
revealed no cases addressing this issue.
31 To "disqualify" a plan means to hold that the plan no longer meets the requirements of
I.R.C. § 401 and accordingly is no longer entitled to the favorable tax treatment accorded
qualified plans. See note 11 supra. Thus, one consequence of disqualification would be that
each participating employee would thereupon be required to include in his gross income any
employer contributions previously made to the plan on his behalf to the extent that his
interest in those contributions was, at the time of disqualification, nonforfeitable. See I.R.C.
§ 402(b); M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS § 20.6 (1977). Typically, any finding of
disqualification (or "nonqualification" if a newly-adopted plan is at issue) would be made
initially by the Internal Revenue Service, either at the time of an audit of the employer's
income tax return (when the employer claims a deduction for a plan contribution pursuant
to I.R.C. § 404) or in response to a request for a determination letter (that is, an official
finding by the Service that a particular plan meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 401, see, e.g.,
Rev. Proc. 72-6, 1972-1 C.B. 710, amplified by Rev. Proc. 75-47, 1975-2 C.B. 581). Court
review is available if the Service finally determines a tax deficiency, I.R.C. § 6213, or declines
to issue a favorable determination letter, I.R.C. § 7476.
For example, § 514 of H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., enacted by the House on February
28, 1974, provided:
Sec. 514. (a) It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that,
except for actions authorized by section 503(e)(1)(B) of this Act and except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section the provisions of part 1 of this subtitle
shall supersede any and all laws of the States and of political subdivisions
thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the reporting and disclo-
sure responsibilities, and fiduciary responsibilities, or persons acting on behalf
of any employee benefit plan to which part 1 applies.
(c) It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that the provi-
sions of parts 2, 3, and 4 of this subtitle shall supersede any and all laws of the
States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to the nonforfeitability of participant's benefits in employee benefit plans
described in section 201(a) or 301(a), the funding requirements for such plans,
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partial preemption ultimately raised the specter of endless litigation
to determine whether a particular state law improperly impinged
upon federal regulation by falling within the preempted subject
area,3" and accordingly the joint conference committee substituted
in the final version of the bill a broad, indeed sweeping, preemption
provision. In his statement to the House of Representatives Con-
gressman Dent, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Labor of the
House Committee on Education and Labor, stated:
The conferees . . . applied this [preemption] principle in its
broadest sense to foreclose any non-Federal regulation of em-
ployee benefit plans. Thus, the provisions of [ERISA § 514]
would reach any rule, regulation, practice or decision of any
State, subdivision thereof or any agency or instrumentality
thereof ... which would affect any employee benefit plan as
described in [ERISA § 4(a)] and not exempt under [ERISA §
4(b).11
This legislative history has led at least one court to conclude:
The courts are to be spared the task of deciding whether a par-
ticular state law governing some aspect of an employee benefit
plan may be enforced concurrently with federal law. Rather, the
preemption question is to be resolved relatively easily by deter-
mining whether the plan in question is a covered federal
plan. . . . [If it is,] no state statute, regulation, or common
law rule, operating of its own force, may govern any aspect of
[the] case.u
the adequacy of financing of such plans, portability requirements for such plans,
or the insurance of pension benefits under such plans.
3a Speaking on behalf of the conference committee's version of the bill, Senator Javits
(ranking minority member of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee) said,
Both House and Senate bills provided for preemption of State law but-with
one major exception appearing in the House bill-defined the perimeters of
preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the bill. Such a formulation
raised the possibility of endless litigation over the validity of State action that
might impinge on Federal regulation, as well as opening the door to multiple
and potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal with some partic-
ular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans.not clearly connected to
the Federal regulatory scheme.
120 CONG. REc. 29942 (1974).
11 Id. at 29197 (1974). See also the remarks of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, in introducing the conference report on
ERISA. [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5188-89.
Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F.Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ind.)
(footnotes omitted), modified on other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); accord, Marshall
v. Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Ass'n), 558 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1977); Wadsworth v. Whaland,
562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977) (dictum); National Carriers' Conference Committee v. Heffernan,
454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294
(N.D. Cal. 1977), affd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1979). Contra,
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As a consequence of this construction it has been held, for example,
that ERISA preempts the ordinary equity power of state courts to
make judicial settlement of trustees' accounts where the trusts in-
volved are the funding media of employee benefit plans,3' 9 and
preempts the states' taxing power where the tax is made specially
applicable to employee benefit plans. 0
This sweeping type of federal preemption, though it has the virtue
of precluding what would otherwise be a good deal of litigation
directed at determining whether a particular state law is preempted
by ERISA, may spawn an even greater quantity of litigation of
another kind.4 Where state law is preempted and no specific federal
provision governs, a "court is forced to make law or leave a void
where neither state nor federal law applies. In such a situation it is
a reasonable inference that Congress intended some law, and there-
fore federal law, to apply."42 In other words, courts will now be
called upon to fashion a federal common law of pension plans and
pension trusts,43 and the legislative history indicates that this is
precisely what Congress intended,44 even though the necessity of
General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976); National Bank of
N. America v. IBEW Local 3, 93 Misc. 2d 590, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1977), affl'd, 69
App. Div. 2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979); see Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel,
460 F.Supp. 978 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
' Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Ass'n), 558 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1977).
4a National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978).
4' ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), has survived a number of challenges to its
constitutionality. See Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal
docketed, No. 78-1095 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1978); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp.
1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affl'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1979).
But where a broad construction of a federal statutory provision purporting to preempt state
law would create a conflict with the federal constitution, a narrower construction of the
preemption provision will be adopted. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Miller, 358 F.
Supp. 1321 (D. Kan.), aff'd without opinion, 414 U.S. 948 (1973) (statute (45 U.S.C. § 546(c)
(1976)) purporting to preempt state laws dealing with passenger railroad service construed
narrowly to avoid conflict with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI).
42 Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512, 1522 (1969) (footnote omitted).
a See Cowan v. Keystone Employee Profit Sharing Fund, 586 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1978).
, Senator Javits, speaking on behalf of the conference version of ERISA, stated: "It is...
intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." 120 CONG.
REc. 29942 (1974). The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Committee that
accompanied ERISA specified that civil actions under ERISA, whether filed in the state or
federal courts, "are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar
fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947."
[1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. Naws 5107. (Under § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1976), to which the Committee Statement refers, the courts have been obliged to fashion a




creating federal rules of decision may result in more litigation than
the broad-brush preemption rule averted.45
Procedural Matters
Although a state law that purports to deny effect to spendthrift
provisions in a pension trust would, as we have seen, be preempted
by ERISA, a pension trustee faced with a state court writ of execu-
tion must nonetheless respond, either by appearing as defendant in
the state court enforcement proceeding and seeking to have the writ
dissolved," or by seeking some sort of injunctive or declaratory relief
in federal court against the state proceeding.47 Obviously, the trus-
tee can seek to vindicate the federal "exemption" by asserting it as
a defense in the state court action, 8 but if he elects to defend in the
state forum, he is bound by the decision of the state tribunals,
according to the normal rules of res judicata, and cannot collaterally
attack an adverse judgment in federal court. 49
Instead of defending in state court, may the trustee bring a suit
in federal court to enjoin the state proceeding? Unless the trustee
15 Of course, although the source of this new law must be federal and uniform, state law
where compatable with national policy, may be resorted to and adopted as a federal rule of
decision. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 406-08 (1970); Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
11 See, e.g., Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc. 2d 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1978);
National Bank of N. America v, IBEW Local 3, 93 Misc. 2d 590, 400 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct.
1977), affl'd, 69 App. Div. 2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979).
41 See, e.g., Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); American Tel. and Tel. Co. v.
Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Operating Engineers Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v.
Zamborsky, 470 F. Sup'p. 1174 (D. Ariz. 1979). The trustee could, of course, do nothing, but
then he would be faced with a state default judgment and with the same problem of whether
to respond to it in state or in federal court. See note 32 supra. Could the trustee, as stake-
holder, simply interplead the employee and the creditor and let the two of them litigate the
issue? This approach has not yet been tried, perhaps because ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104
(1976), which imposes certain broad responsibilities upon plan fiduciaries, can be read as
requiring the trustee to defend the employee's interests. The section provides in part that "a
fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the partici-
pants and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . .providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries . . . " Id.
See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3527 (1977).
Lavasek v. White, 339 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1965). Since the application of a federal
statutory exemption is at issue, the trustee could obtain United States Supreme Court review
of an adverse decision if it is the final judgment of the highest state court in which a decision
could be had. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MnILER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4017 (1977). For an interesting discussion of whether the
trustee may, at least where the creditor is the spouse or former spouse of the employee, remove
the case to federal court, see Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 78-2313,(9th Cir. June 21, 1978). See generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 38 (1976).
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can show that the continuation of the state proceeding would cause
irreparable harm and that the legal remedy of appearing as defen-
dant in state court is inadequate, he will not be entitled to an
injunction. Ordinarily, exposure to litigation is not such irreparable
harm as will justify an injunction. The trustee would not be entitled
to injunctive relief merely by demonstrating that, without it, he
would have to defend against the writ of execution in state court.50
The so-called "multiplicity of actions" rationale is a better argu-
ment to support the trustee's petition for an injunction. Frequently,
a court will grant an injunction where, because it would require a
multiplicity of actions at law to arrive at a result that can be accom-
plished by a single injunction, the remedy at law is deemed inade-
quate. 5' The trustee should argue that one of the purposes of ERISA
is to enable plan participants to predict what their future benefits
will be, by assuring them that their accrued benefits will be safe
from attack by creditors; the trust property should therefore be
devoted to the payment of retirement benefits and not be consumed
in defending the trust, however successfully, against a succession of
writs of execution.
These goals can be achieved more readily by a federal injunction
and declaratory judgment than by a successful defense by the trus-
tee in a particular state proceeding involving a particular writ. In-
deed, if the trustee defends in a state proceeding on both a state and
a federal ground, and the state court finds for the trustee on the
basis of the state defense, the state court result leaves the partici-
pants and the trustee as uncertain as before of their rights and
obligations. For example, suppose the trustee appeared as party
defendent in state court and opposed enforcement of the writ on two
grounds: (1) that the state statute of limitations on enforcement of
such writs had run, and (2) that ERISA barred the enforcement of
the writ. If the state court declined to enforce the writ on the ground
that the statute of limitations had run and did not address the
ERISA issue, the trustee and participants would still be unsure
whether accrued benefits under the plan would be safe from attack
by more vigilant creditors.
Even if the trustees can establish that there is no adequate rem-
edy at law, will the federal anti-injunction statute 2 preclude relief?
This statute excepts from its general prohibition injunctions
"See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
" A leading case is Colliton v. Oxborough, 86 Minn. 361, 90 N.W. 793 (1902).
""A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
19801 ERISA
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
"expressly authorized by Act of Congress." In order for this excep-
tion to apply, it is not necessary that a federal law contain an ex-
press reference to the anti-injunction statute or expressly authorize
an injunction against a state court proceeding.5 3 "The test, rather,
is whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or
remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its
intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding."'" As
to the first part of this test, it is clear that ERISA § 206(d) creates
a federal right and that ERISA § 502 gives the federal courts exclu-
sive jurisdiction to entertain suits by plan fiduciaries to enjoin all
acts or practices that violate that right. As to the second part of
the test (the requirement that the federal right cannot be given its
intended scope unless the state proceeding is enjoined), so long as
the state execution proceeding is in progress, the status of the par-
ticipant's accrued pension benefit is uncertain, and section 206(d)
was designed to insulate benefits from just that uncertainty. Conse-
quently, the anti-injunction statute should not be a bar to the trus-
tee's suit, and the courts have agreed.56
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
Even that majority of jurisdictions that gives effect to spend-
thrift provisions nevertheless permits creditors to levy upon
spendthrift trust assets in certain exceptional circumstances. Three
of these exceptions merit our attention: (1) self-settled trusts; (2)
claims for alimony and child support; and (3) tax claims. Since the
courts will be called upon to fashion a federal common law of
'3 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237 (1972).
1, Id. at 238.
15 ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1976), authorizes suits by plan fiduciaries
"to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or ... to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions
of this title. ... ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1976), gives federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction to entertain such suits.
5 Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Senco, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F.
Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979);-see Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Ass'n), 558 F.2d
680, 683 (2d Cir. 1977). There is an important line of recent Supreme Court cases, chief among
which is Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), holding that principles of comity unique to
"Our Federalism" prevent federal courts from enjoining state proceedings in certain circum-
stances, even where the anti-injunction statute would permit the injunction. The cases so far,
however, have confined this limitation to state criminal proceedings and quasi-criminal pro-
ceedings to which a state is a party. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (suit by
state to recover fraudulently-obtained welfare payments); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592, 603-05 (1975) (nuisance action brought by state).
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spendthrift trusts in connection with employee pension plans,57 the
extent to which these exceptions will be incorporated into this fed-
eral law is a matter of some importance.
Self-Settled Trusts
It is uniformly held at common law that where the settlor of a
spendthrift trust is also a beneficiary of the trust, the spendthrift
provision will not insulate his interest from the claims of his credi-
tors,58 since "[i]t is against public policy to permit a man to tie up
his own property in such a way that he can still enjoy it but can
prevent his creditors from reaching it.''5 (Any other beneficiaries of
such a trust, however, would be protected by the spendthrift
clause.) Frequently, pension plans permit or even require employees
to make contributions to the plan, which are invested by the trustee
along with the contributions made by the employer. Should the
courts, in fashioning a federal common law of spendthrift trusts,
adopt the self-settled trust exception, so that, notwithstanding the
language required by ERISA § 206(d) and I.R.C. § 401(a)(13), a
creditor of an employee could attach that portion of the employee's
interest in the trust attributable to the employee's own
contributions?"0
In support of a "no exceptions" construction of section 206(d), it
could be argued that section 206(d) is designed to protect plans qua
57 See notes 42-45 & accompanying text supra.
" Nelson v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal. 2d 501, 202 P.2d 1021 (1949); Warner v. Rice, 66
Md. 436, 8 A. 84 (1887); Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 204 So. 2d
856 (Miss. 1967); Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa. 584, 21 A. 135 (1891). But cf. Booth v. Chad-
wick, 154 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Ct. App. 1941) (holding that where the settlor, while in prison,
creates a spendthrift trust for his own benefit, the spendthrift provision will be valid, at least
while he remains in prison).
State statutory provisions authorizing spendthrift trusts likewise except self-settled trusts
from this protection. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 33-101 (1973); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 7-3.1 (McKinney 1967).
See generally E. GRISWOLD, SPEaNrrrnFr TRusTs §§ 471-99 (2d ed. 1947).
5, 2 A. Scorr, supra note 20, at § 156.
* Suppose A owns Blackacre, worth $100,000. A transfers Blackacre to B in exchange for
B's establishment of a $100,000 spendthrift trust for A's benefit. Since A furnished the
consideration for the trust, he will be regarded as the settlor of the trust for purposes of the
self-settled trust rule. Id. The argument could therefore be made in the case of a pension trust
that since the employee furnishes the consideration (labor) for the establishment of the trust
by the employer, the employee should be regarded as the settlor of the trust, and the spend-
thrift restriction should therefore have no effect on the employee's interest. This construction,
however, would render ERISA § 206(d) meaningless and ought therefore to be rejected if it
is ever suggested in litigation. See Fordyce v. Fordyce, 80 Misc. 2d 909, 365 N.Y.S. 2d 323
(Sup. Ct. 1974) (a pre-ERISA case that rejected an analogous argument with reference to a
state statute similar to § 206(d)).
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plans: that is, that ERISA's spendthrift provision is designed not to
protect employees from creditors but rather to protect plans from
the burden of having to respond to garnishments or make payments
of benefits to assignees. It has been held, for example, that the
provision of the Railroad Retirement Act 6 exempting the retirement
fund from attachment "was intended solely to relieve the Federal
authorities as administrators of the fund from the annoyance of
attachment of pensions or annuities in their hands."62 In view of the
legislative history of ERISA, 3 however, and in view of ERISA provi-
sions which in some circumstances permit voluntary and revocable
assignments,64 the view that section 206(d) is designed to protect
plans rather than employees is unsound and was properly rejected
in Stone v. Stone.15 We must therefore turn elsewhere for a solution
to this problem.
A somewhat tautological Pennsylvania statute6 provided67 that if
a pension plan prohibited the voluntary or involuntary alienation of
benefits, those benefits should indeed be exempt from the claims of
creditors; in other words, the statute purported to authorize, though
it did not require, the imposition of spendthrift restrictions upon
pension plan assets. Avenue Motor Co. v. Emro5 involved a contri-
butory pension plan. As a condition of employment, each employee
was required, by means of a deduction from his wages, to make a
contribution to the plan, and the employer contributed a matching
amount. Although the plan contained the spendthrift provision con-
templated by the state statute, the creditor of a participating em-
ployee sought to levy upon that portion of the employee's accrued
benefit attributable to the employee's own contributions. The credi-
tor cited the Restatement of Trusts in support of the levy: "Where
" 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976) (codified prior to 1974 as 45 U.S.C. § 228R).
42 Commonwealth v. Berfield, 160 Pa. Super. Ct. 438, 442, 51 A.2d 523, 525 (1947); accord,
La Farr v. La Farr, 132 Vt. 191, 315 A.2d 235 (1974); Heuchan v. Heuchan, 38 Wash. 2d 207,
228 P.2d 470 (1951).
See note 7 supra.
, See notes 176-83 & accompanying text infra.
450 F. Supp. 919, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Cf. Johnston v. Johnston (In re Marriage of
Johnston), 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978), where the court refused to allow
the plan trustee to deduct $5.00 per garnished pension payment to reimburse the trust for
the allegedly greater administrative cost of making two payments per month (part of the
benefit went to the employee and part to the creditor, his spouse) instead of one.
66 40 PA. STAT. § 515 (1971). This statute was in its present form repealed, Act of April 28,
1978, Pub. L. No. 53, § 2(a), effective June 27, 1978, and replaced by a similar provision
recently enacted, 42 PA. STAT. § 8124(b)(7) and (8) (Pamph. 1979).
91 Although the statute, in recodified form, is still on the books, it has presumably been
preempted by ERISA. See notes 35-40 & accompanying text supra.
" 124 Prrr. LEGAL J. 103 (C.P. Allegheny County 1976).
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a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision restrain-
ing the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his trans-
feree or creditors can reach his interest." 9 The court dissolved the
writ of execution, thereby upholding the spendthrift protection,
stating:
[Plension funds are created for the mutual benefit of employe
[sic] and employer: The employer is particularly interested in
maintaining the morale of each employe and the esprit de corps
of all employes and also is interested in minimizing the fiscally
enervating cost of employe turnover. Thus, it may well be con-
cluded that even if the trust was created in part by the action
of the employee Defendant in authorizing the withholding of
wages or salary as savings, the trust was created, at least in part,
by the employer and was therefore not created exclusively by
the employee for his own benefit within the meaning of
[RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156].7o
Two aspects of Avenue Motor ought to be noted. First, although
the plan asserted as one of its defenses that ERISA § 206(d) pre-
cluded the execution, the court never once adverted to ERISA in its
opinion, and indeed the writ of execution seems to have been issued
prior to the effective date of the ERISA provision.71 However, be-
cause the plan contained the same language that section 206(d) now
requires, this case does at least suggest the direction that the federal
common law of pension trusts ought to take. Second, while the
court's analysis, quoted above, is persuasive as regards mandatory
employee contributions, 72 it begins to break down when voluntary
employee contributions are considered. Indeed in Fordyce v.
Fordyce,7" another pre-ERISA case, a New York court interpreting
New York statutory law74 drew a distinction between voluntary and
mandatory employee contributions. It denied execution against the
portion of the accrued benefit attributable to mandatory employee
contributions, using reasoning similar to that employed by the
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1959).
7 124 Pirr. LEGAL J. 103, 105 (emphasis in original).
7' See ERISA § 211(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1061(b)(1) (1976).
72 Mandatory employee contributions are contributions required as a condition of employ-
ment, as a condition of participation in the plan, or as a condition of obtaining benefits under
the plan attributable to employer contributions.
7 80 Misc. 2d 909, 365 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
" N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (McKinney 1967) provides that "[a] disposi-
tion in trust for the use of the creator is void as against existing or subsequent creditors of
the creator." N.Y. Civ. PaAc. LAW § 5205(c) (McKinney 1978) provides that "[a]ny property
while held in trust for a judgment debtor, where the trust has been created by, or the fund
so held in trust has proceeded from, a person other than the judgment debtor, is exempt from
application to the satisfaction of a money judgment."
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Avenue Motor court, and permitted execution against the portion
attributable to the voluntary contributions. The court reasoned that
this latter portion was in essence a self-settled trust, because the
employee had on his own put the property aside for his own use
later, and because such contributions were essentially unrelated to
his labor, the employer having served as a mere conduit for this
investment. 75
In view of Congress' announced policy of protecting employees'
expectations regarding retirement benefits, 7 it seems clear that
courts, in fashioning a federal common law of pension trusts, should
follow Avenue Motor, and hold that mandatory employee contribu-
tions are not in the nature of self-settled trust contributions and
that, accordingly, the ERISA spendthrift provision prevents attach-
ment or alienation of accrued benefits attributable to mandatory
employee contributions. But what of accrued benefits attributable
to voluntary employee contributions? On the one hand, the implied
congressional policy of encouraging employee thrift suggests that
courts ought to reject the self-settled trust exception for voluntary
contributions as well. On the other hand, insulating voluntary con-
tributions from creditors' claims would encourage some employees
to make plan contributions in excess of their legitimate retirement
needs solely for the purpose of defeating creditors.
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a pension plan will
fail to qualify under I.R.C. § 401 if the terms of the plan permit an
employee to make voluntary contributions in excess of ten percent
of his compensation, 7 and search has revealed no case in which this
rule has even been challenged. The Service's position is based on its
view that
the tax advantages provided under a qualified ... plan were
not intended by Congress to be extended to unlimited contribu-
tions by employees made primarily to escape [current taxation
of the income those contributions earn while in the pension
trust]. However, where the purpose of a voluntary contribution
feature in a plan is to encourage savings by participants, such
feature is acceptable provided the contributions are kept within
reasonable bounds. In this respect ... employee contributions
are deemed to be reasonable if they do not exceed ten percent
of compensation. 8
This analysis suggests that courts ought to distinguish between vol-
,5 80 Misc. 2d 909, 913, 365 N.Y.S.2d 323, 328 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
7' See ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
7" Rev. Rul. 59-185, 1959-1 C.B. 86.
" Rev. Rul. 69-217, 1969-1 C.B. 115, 116.
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untary employee contributions reasonably necessary for retirement
saving and those contributions in excess of that amount and conse-
quently deemed to have been made for a nonprotected purpose; the
"reasonable" contributions would be protected by the spendthrift
provision, and the "excess" would not. The suggested rule would
apply to qualified and nonqualified plans alike.
Ought courts to adopt the Service's ten percent rule as the line
of demarcation, or should they, rather, determine what is
"reasonable" on a case-by-case basis? Ordinarily, of course, the
establishment of specific numerical limits is more the province of a
legislature or an administrative agency than a court, since a court
is presumed to lack the technical expertise needed to formulate such
rules. Recent judicial developments, however, suggest a greater will-
ingness on the part of courts to make such formulations. 9
The Supreme Court has observed that "[t]reasury regulations
and interpretations long continued without substantial change,
applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are
deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect
of law."8" Since the Service's position with respect to voluntary em-
ployee contributions was first announced no later than 1959,1 a
strong case can be made that this ten percent figure represents the
upper limit on what Congress regards as voluntary employee contri-
butions made for the purposes it had in mind when it created the
qualified plan concept. Of course, not all Title I pension plans are
qualified, and the Service did not fashion the ten percent rule with
spendthrift restrictions in mind; but the situations are sufficiently
analogous to suggest that courts should adopt the rule that the
portion of an accrued benefit attributable to voluntary employee
contributions up to ten percent of compensation is exempt from
attachment and that the portion attributable to voluntary employee
contributions in excess of ten percent is vulnerable to attachment.
8 2
", See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (state restrictions on the right of a woman
to obtain an abortion held unconstitutional as applicable during the first trimester of preg-
nancy although they might be constitutional as applied after the first trimester).
" Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938) (footnote omitted), quoted with approval
in Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 292 (1945); accord, Alabama v. United States, 461
F.2d 1324 (Ct. Cl. 1972). "The law is well established that long standing administrative
interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its execution is entitled to great weight
." Id. at 1329.
See Rev. Rul. 59-185, 1959-1 C.B. 86.
' I.R.C. § 410(b)(1) provides that if a plan does not cover a substantial percentage of an
employer's employees (the percentage requirements are set forth in I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(A)),
the plan will fail to qualify unless the group of employees in fact covered by the plan consti-
tutes a classification that does not discriminate in favor of employees who are officers, share-
holders or highly compensated. The Service takes the position with respect to mandatory
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The alternative, at least in the absence of further congressional
action, would be a less predictable rule: that voluntary employee
contributions in excess of what is "reasonably related" to retirement
saving are not protected by the spendthrift provision.,
So far in this discussion of self-settled trusts, we have assumed
that the employer and the employee are separate entities; but sup-.
pose they are the same. Suppose a self-employed physician estab-
lishes a pension plan pursuant to which he is required to contribute
to a trust an amount equal to fifteen percent of his earnings. Will
the entire contribution be regarded as the equivalent of voluntary
employee contributions with the result that (assuming the "ten per-
cent" rule is adopted) one-third of that contribution (the amount
in excess of ten percent) will be unprotected by the ERISA spend-
thrift restriction? If so, then self-employed individuals who make
contributions to pension plans would receive less protection from
creditors than would common law employees on whose behalf con-
tributions are made, a result at pronounced variance with the trend
in Congress, at least as regards qualified plans, td eliminate any
differences in tax treatment between self-employed persons (includ-
employee contributions that a plan will fail to meet the "nondiscrimination" requirement of
I.R.C. § 410(b)(1) if the contribution rate required of employees is so burdensome as to make
the plan acceptable only to the highly-paid employees, Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(d) (1956) (this
regulation was issued under the predecessor to I.R.C. § 410(b)(1) but is still the official
Service statement on the issue), but generally finds mandatory contribution rates of no more
than 6% of compensation to be nonburdensome. Rev. Rul. 72-58, 1972-1 C.B. 111. If a plan
provides for both mandatory and voluntary employee contributions, the 6% limitation on the
former and the 10% limitation on the latter are applied cumulatively. Thus, a qualified plan
that required all participants to contribute 6% of their compensation could also permit them
to contribute an additional 10% of compensation: a total of 16%. Cf. Rev. Rul. 70-658, 1970-
2 C.B. 86. The rule proposed in the accompanying text should apply to voluntary contribu-
tions whether or not the plan provides for mandatory contributions as well. The rule proposed
in the text accompanying note 76 supra to the effect that mandatory contributions are pro-
tected by the spendthrift clause, should apply whether or not the contribution rate is burden-
some, since the 6% limitation on mandatory contributions derives from a requirement of
nondiscrimination, not (like the 10% limitation on voluntary contributions) from a require-
ment that contributions be restricted to legitimate retirement savings needs.
83 If this question could arise only in the context of involuntary alienations (that is, aliena-
tions in behalf of creditors), the "reasonably related" rule would be no less practicable than
the "10%" rule; since involuntary alienations generally require some sort of judicial action,
the court could, in the same proceeding, determine what amount is "reasonably related." But
we must also consider the case of voluntary alienations, since any voluntary contributions
which, because of the self-settled trust rule, are not protected by the spendthrift clause would
be voluntarily alienable by the participant. Merchants Nat'l Bank of New Bedford v. Morris-
sey, 329 Mass. 601, 109 N.E.2d 821 (1953); Glass v. Carpenter, 330 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Ct. App.
1959). Because voluntary alienations are effected without the intervention of courts, a rule
which limited the participant's right of voluntary alienation to that amount in excess of his
reasonable retirement needs would be quite unworkable. A rule defining that right with
reference to the 10% limit would be considerably more practicable.
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ing partners in partnerships) and common law employees."4
Search has revealed five cases raising the issue of the self-settled
trust exception in the context .of pension plans for the self-
employed.8 5 The cases arose in New York, where statutory law auto-
matically exempts from execution in satisfaction of money judg-
ments the corpus of any trust and ninety percent of the income of
any trust created for the benefit of the judgment debtor, unless "the
trust has been created by, or the fund so held in trust has proceeded
from, . . . the judgment debtor. ... 1e The cases are puzzling in
that, although ERISA § 206(d) was clearly applicable to each trans-
action, not one of the opinions refers to it; instead, each opinion
focuses only on the New York statute. In every case but Alexandre"7
the creditor was permitted to reach the assets in the Keogh plan,8
but the reasoning in these cases was inadequate. In Lerner and
Pafumi the courts found for the creditor because they concluded
" Prior to 1962 pension plans in which sole proprietors or members of partnerships partici-
pated could not qualify under I.R.C. § 401 because such persons were not "employees" within
the meaning of I.R.C. § 401(a). I.T. 3350, 1940-1 C.B. 64; I.T. 3268, 1939-1 C.B. 196. The Self-
Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962),
extended the benefits of qualified plans to the self-employed, but because Congress thought
that plans covering the self-employed would tend to be small plans, offering greater opportu-
nities for abuse than large corporate plans, H.R. REP. No. 378, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961);
S. REP. No. 1615, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), special restrictions were placed upon plans for
the self-employed. Among these was a limitation on the deductions that could be claimed
pursuant to I.R.C. § 404 for contributions on behalf of the self-employed. The limitation was
the lesser of $2,500 or 10% of the self-employed individual's earned income from the trade or
business for which the plan was established. See generally Chadwick & Foster, Federal
Regulation of Retirement Plans: The Quest for Parity, 28 VAND. L. Rav. 641, 658-65 (1975).
In 1974, with the enactment of ERISA, these limits were increased to $7,500 and 15%, respec-
tively, ERISA § 2001; I.R.C. § 404(e), and for the first time significant limits were imposed
upon contributions to and benefits payable under qualified plans covering only common law
employees. ERISA § 2004, I.R.C. § 415.
Qualified plans covering self-employed individuals are frequently called "Keogh plans"
(after the New York congressman who was a co-sponsor of the original bill dealing with
qualified plans for the self-employed) or "H.R. 10 plans" (after the number of the bill that
became the 1962 Act).
13 Alexandre v. Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Ass'n), 61 App. Div. 2d 537, 403 N.Y.S.2d
21 (1978); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 90 Misc. 2d 673, 395 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Pafumi
v. Bowery Say. Bank, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 9, 1976, at 5, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Plymouth Rock
Fuel Corp. v. Bank of New York, 91 Misc. 2d 837, 398 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Civ. Ct. 1977); Lerner
v. Williamsburg Sav. Bank, 87 Misc. 2d 685, 386 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Civ. Ct. 1976).
" N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5205(c)-(d) (McKinney's 1978). If a court finds any part of that
90 percent of trust income to be unnecessary for the reasonable requirements of the judgment
debtor and his dependents, such part is not exempt under this statute.
" 61 App. Div. 2d 537, 403 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1978). The opinion inAlexandre was inconclusive,
since the court found the record insufficient and directed that the trial court hold a plenary
hearing on the issue of what the contracting parties to the plAn-the trustee and the partner-
ship-intended their agreement to mean.
0 For the definition of "Keogh plan," see note 84 supra.
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that in both cases the debtor had a present right to withdraw his
interest from the trust fund,89 a conclusion that, at least in the case
of Lerner, was erroneous" and was impliedly criticized in Alexandre.
R9 If a trust, from its very inception, provides that the principal is to be paid to a beneficiary
whenever he may demand it, any spendthrift language in the trust instrument is ignored, and
the beneficiary's interest is vulnerable to his creditors. Croom v. Ocala Plumbing and Electric
Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243 (1911); Ullman v. Cameron, 186 N.Y. 339, 78 N.E. 1074 (1906).
The courts reason that in such a case the spendthrift restriction is illusory-that the settlor
did not really intend to insulate the funds from the beneficiary's improvidence but instead
attempted to give the beneficiary property more or less outright without exposing it to any
claims of the beneficiary's creditors. Public policy should thwart such attempts.
" The courts in these cases seem to have assumed that because the debtor-participant was
self-employed, he automatically retained the right to reclaim whenever he wished the contri-
butions made to the trust on his behalf by the partnership. This assumption is unfounded.
First of all, if the plan is qualified and the participant in question has more than a 10%
interest in the capital or profits of the partnership, the trust instrument must expressly
prohibit him from withdrawing any portion of his trust account (except that attributable to
nondeductible contributions made as an "employee") prior to age 59 1/2, except in the event
of disability or death. I.R.C. § 401(d)(4)(B). Second, the common law of trusts would ordinar-
ily prevent such withdrawals, even if I.R.C. § 401(d)(4)(B) was not a bar, unless the instru-
ment expressly permits them. See 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 20, at § 329A.
Suppose the partner in question controls the settlor-partnership: i.e., he has more than a
50% partnership interest. Would he, by virtue of such control, automatically retain the right
to reclaim contributions made to the plan on his behalf by the partnership? The settlor of a
trust cannot, of course, terminate the trust unless all the beneficiaries of the trust consent,
in the absence of an express power to do so reserved by the settlor in the trust instrument.
Sutliff v. Aydelott, 373 Ill. 633, 27 N.E.2d 529 (1940); Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 N.Y.
43, 19 N.E.2d 673 (1939). It is equally clear that a trust beneficiary cannot, without the
consent of the settlor, terminate or modify the trust unless it is clear that such termination
or modification would not frustrate any material purpose of the settlor in establishing the
trust. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS
§§ 337(2), 338(1) (1959). There is some case law to suggest, however, that where the settlor
and one of the beneficiaries consent, the trust can be terminated as to that beneficiary,
provided that such "partition" of the trust does not adversely affect the interests of the other
beneficiaries. Ames v. Hall, 313 Mass. 33, 46 N.E.2d 403 (1943); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Birch, 121 N.J. Eq. 132, 186 A. 816 (1936); see Duncan v. Kahn, 151 Cal. App. 2d 402, 311
P.2d 587 (1957). It is difficult to see how a participant in a Keogh plan could realistically
claim that his interest in the trust would be adversely affected by the withdrawal of the
controlling partner's interest. A Keogh plan is typically drafted to provide that moneys
originally contributed for the benefit of one participant cannot be forfeited and used to
provide benefits for another participant. Since most Keogh plans are invested in bank trust
departments with funds commingled with those of other plans, no participant could realisti-
cally claim that the removal from the fund of one participant's share makes the portfolio less
diversified. If, therefore, the controlling partner (by virtue of such control, not by virtue of
being a partner) has the power to withdraw his interest from the pension trust whenever he
wishes, it would follow that he is not protected by the spendthrift provision. See note 89 supra.
Since that result is obviously at variance with Congress' intentions, is there any escape from
it?
First Trust Co. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Minn. 1970), involved a pension
plan in which there participated a person who owned 97% of the stock of the company
maintaining the plan. The Internal Revenue Service argued that because the stockholder had
the power, by virtue of such control, to compel the plan administrators to make a discretion-
ary distribution to him (even though such discretionary distributions had never been made
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Neither case, however, makes any reference to the self-settled trust
rule. It is unclear whether the decisions in Sheehan and Plymouth
Rock permitted attachment because of the self-settled trust rule or
because the creditor had what the courts supposed was a present
right to withdraw his interest from the trust fund. The situation is
further complicated by the fact that Sheehan and probably Lerner
involved claims for alimony or support, which might be another
unstated reason for the decisions in those cases, since alimony and
support claims are generally regarded as favored claims unaffected
by spendthrift restrictions."
The self-settled trust rule, if applied relentlessly in this context,
leads to unfortunate results. Congress, in order to allow a sole pro-
prietor to establish a qualified plan and deduct contributions to it,
provided in the Internal Revenue Code that the proprietor is to be
regarded as both employer and his own employee. As an employer,
he may make a plan contribution for his own benefit as an employee
up to the lesser of $7,500 or fifteen percent of the income he earns
from the proprietorship, and he may claim a tax deduction for that
contribution.2 Any contribution he makes in excess of that amount
is deemed to have been made by him as an employee and is conse-
quently not deductible. (The same rules apply in the case of a part-
nership; the partnership may contribute and deduct on behalf of
each partner up to the lesser of $7,500 or fifteen percent of his
income earned from the partnership business. Any additional con-
tribution is regarded as having been made by the partner himself
as an employee of the partnership and is not deductible.)
Suppose, for example, a sole proprietor earns $100,000 from the
proprietorship and contributes $10,000 on his own behalf to a Keogh
in the past to anyone), he should be treated for tax purposes as if he had actually received
that distribution. The court found for the taxpayer, pointing out that even though the stock-
holder may have had the power in theory, in fact he would not have exercised it, since to do
so would have destroyed the plan. (The court was stretching a bit here. What they probably
meant was that if the stockholder had demanded the distribution and got it, it would have
created ill-feeling among the rank-and-file employees, who did not have this privilege and
whose good-will the plan was adopted to foster; and that if the rank-and-file had been given
this privilege, so many assets would have left the plan that it would have been a shell of its
former self.) In addition, the court noted that if the stockholder had withdrawn his interest
by exercising his control power over the plan administrators, the plan would have lost its
qualification. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4).
The reasoning of the First Trust case is applicable to the problem at hand. If a controlling
partner in fact withdrew his interest from the Keogh plan, it would cause the very problems
noted in First Trust. If, therefore, the controlling partner should not be "penalized" for having
a mere theoretical power to withdraw his interest from the trust, he should not forfeit the
benefits of the spendthrift clause on account of the existence of that power.
" See notes 98-100 & accompanying text infra.
,2 I.R.C. §§ 401(d)(5)(A), 404(e)(1).
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plan. He may deduct $7,500 from his gross income, since for tax
purposes that amount is regarded as having been paid by his
"employer." The remaining $2,500 is treated as a voluntary contri-
bution made by him as an employee and is not deductible.13 But for
purposes of the self-settled trust rule, is the proprietor deemed to
have made a "voluntary" employee contribution of $10,000, $2,500,
or nothing? Earlier it was suggested 4 that voluntary employee con-
tributions not in excess of ten percent of compensation should be
treated as not coming within the self-settled trust rule-that is, they
should be protected by the spendthrift provision. That suggestion
was offered, however, with regard to common law employees, who
presumably have no direct control over the amount of contributions
made by the employer. A sole proprietor, on the other hand, has
such control: all contributions made by a sole proprietor, even if
those contributions fall within the deductible limits, are in a sense
"voluntary." However, to regard the entire contribution as volun-
tary for purposes of the self-settled trust rule would mean either that
a sole proprietor could not enjoy the benefit of the spendthrift re-
striction to any extent at all, or that he could enjoy that benefit only
to the extent of ten percent of his earnings from the proprietorship,
a figure which is less than the deductible limits now applicable to
the proprietor. Either way, the sole proprietor would be at a disad-
vantage when compared with a corporate employee, as far as
spendthrift protection is concerned, and Congress has been trying
to eliminate any kind of difference in treatment between the two
groups of taxpayers. 5
One tempting solution is to accord a sole proprietor spendthrift
protection at least to the extent of the deductible limits of I.R.C. §
404(e);11 but what about a nonqualified plan established by a sole
proprietor? The deductible limits of I.R.C. § 404(e) are inapplicable
to such a plan; indeed, no portion of the contribution made by the
proprietor to his own account under the plan would be deductible.
Does that mean that under such a plan the proprietor would not
,3 If the sole proprietor is the only participant in such plan, he may not make any voluntary
contributions; he may contribute only $7,500. I.R.C. § 401(d)(5)(B).
" See notes 77-83 & accompanying text supra.
" See note 84 supra.
A Pennsylvania statute takes this approach, exempting from attachment or execution
any retirement or annuity fund or any self-employed person (to the extent of
payments thereto made while solvent, but not exceeding the amount actually
excluded or deducted as retirement funding for Federal income tax purposes)
and the appreciation thereon, the income therefrom and the benefits or annuity
payable thereunder.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8124(b)(8) (Pamph. 1979). The statute, though still on the books, has
presumably been preempted by ERISA.
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have the benefit of the spendthrift protection? ERISA § 206(d)
clearly applies to a nonqualified funded plan established by a sole
proprietor, even if the proprietor is the only participant, which cer-
tainly implies that Congress wants such a plan to be protected by
the spendthrift provision. Yet if the plan was so protected, a sole
proprietor would be able to insulate from his creditors whatever
portion of his earnings he desired simply by placing it in a trust fund
that he denominated a pension plan.97 Clearly, Congress has not
thought the issue through. The question of the effect of the spend-
thrift provision upon self-employed persons requires more thought-
ful and detailed legislative attention.
Alimony and Support
It has long been held as a matter of general common law that the
spouse or children of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust may
enforce against the beneficiary's interest in the trust their claims
against him for support." The traditional justification for this rule
is that a provision in a trust prohibiting attachment by creditors was
not intended by the settlor to apply to support claims of a wife or
child, because they are not "creditors" in the usual sense and the
obligation to support them is not a debt.9 A more straightforward
explanation is simply that it is against public policy to allow a trust
beneficiary to enjoy trust property and yet relbgate to the state the
burden of supporting his pauperized dependents.10 It is submitted
that this rule ought to be adopted as part of the federal common law
of pension plans: the ERISA spendthrift provision should be held
not to bar the claims of a participant's spouse or children for support
or alimony.
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code both make special conces-
sions in other areas to the spouses of participating employees: for
example, the requirements relating to joint and survivor annuities 0'
,7 When a plan is nonqualified, there are no limitations on the amount that may be contrib-
uted thereto and no prohibition against discrimination as to coverage in favor of the proprie-
tor.
11 Keller v. Keller, 284 ll. App. 198, 1 N.E.2d 773 (1936); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Robertson, 192 Md. 653, 65 A.2d 292 (1949); Dillon v. Dillon, 244 Wis. 122, 11 N.W.2d 628
(1943).
1, 2 A. Scorr, supra note 20, at § 157.1.
'0 Id.
101 ERISA § 205, 29 USC § 1055 (1976), and I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) require plans that make
benefit payments in the form of annuities to contain elaborate provisions relating to the form
those annuities are to take, where the annuitant is married. The purpose of these provisions
is to prevent the participant from inadvertently failing to make provision under the plan for
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and those relating to improper post-retirement accumulations.'12
Spendthrift provisions in other federal statutes have been construed
to permit executions enforcing support obligations. The District of
Columbia Life Insurance Act, for instance, provided that no money
or other benefit to be paid on account of disability would be liable
to execution or garnishment,' °3 but in spite of that restriction it was
held in Schlaefer v. Schlaefer04 that execution enforcing a support
obligation could be levied against such insurance benefits:
[T]he usual purpose of exemptions is to relieve the person ex-
empted from the pressure of claims hostile to his dependents'
essential needs as well as his own personal ones, not to relieve
him of familial obligations and destroy what may be the family's
last and only security, short of public relief."5
A similar provision in the Social Security Act, purporting to exempt
his spouse in the event that the participant dies before receiving his full benefit. See note
131 & accompanying text infra.
"I The Internal Revenue Service has consistently ruled that a qualified plan may not be
used as a device to provide benefits to the employee's survivors instead of to the employee
himself. Accordingly, when a participant retires, he may not select a form of benefit payment
calculated to provide his beneficiary with greater benefits than he himself will get. When the
participant elects a form of benefit that includes a survivor's benefit, the present value (at
retirement) of the participant's benefit must be greater than 50% of the total present value
of the participant's benefit and the survivor's benefit. For example, suppose when a partici-
pant retires, he elects to receive his benefit in the form of an annuity of $100 per month for
his life, and upon his death $100 per month to his granddaughter X for her life if she survives
him. Let us say that the present value of the participant's annuity is $10,000, and that
(because of X's youth and consequent long life expectancy) the present value of the partici-
pant's benefit and the survivor's benefit is $40,000. Because $10,000 is not greater than 50%
of $40,000, this form of benefit payment is not permitted. However, if the designated survivor
annuitant is the spouse of the participant, this restriction is ignored. Rev. Rul. 74-359, 1974-
2 C.B. 129; Rev. Rul. 74-325, 1974-2 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 72-241, 1972-1 C.B. 108; Rev. Rul.
72-240, 1972-1 C.B. 108; Rev. Rul. 56-656, 1956-2 C.B. 280.
'3 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-436, ch. V, § 16(a), 48 Stat. 1175 provided:
No money or other benefit paid. . . by any company on account of the disabil-
ity from injury or sickness of.any insured person shall be liable to execution,
attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated
or applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law, to pay any debt
or liability of such insured person whether such debt or liability was incurred
before or after the commencement of such disability, but the provisions of this
section shall not affect the assignability of any such disability benefit otherwise
assignable, nor shall this section apply to any money income disability benefit
in an action to recover for necessaries contracted for after the commencement
of the disability covered by the disability clause or contract allowing such money
income benefit.
This provision is now codified, in substantially altered form, in D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 35-716
(West 1968).
,0, 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
'o Id. at 185.
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from garnishment benefits under the Act, '"' has likewise been held
not to bar garnishments for alimony or support claims. As one court
put it:
[T]he intent of the exemption in §407 of the Social Security
Act is to enable the insured to support himself, his family, and
those legally dependent upon him, and to protect the family
unit from the claims of general creditors, not to allow him to
protect himself from money obligations owed to his depen-
dents.'07
The majority of cases construing the spendthrift provision of ERISA
have likewise held, and properly so, that the claims for suppori of a
participating employee's spouse or children are enforceable against
the participant's interest in a pension plan;' 8 indeed, search has
revealed only one case that holds to the contrary.' 9 Taking no com-
fort in this line of cases, however, Senators Harrison and Javitz
included in their proposed ERISA Improvements Act of 1979 ''o a
provision (section 128) that would amend ERISA §§ 206(d) and
514(b) and I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) to expressly permit enforcement
against covered pension plans of state court judgments or orders
affecting marital property rights, alimony or child support pay-
ments.
Suppose the person whose pension benefits are garnished to pay
his spouse's claims was never an employee. For example, E is cov-
ered by a pension plan which provides that upon E's death prior to
retirement it will pay E's surviving husband, H, the sum of $200 per
month for his life. E does indeed die prior to retirement, and the
lN Social Security Act § 207, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976) provides:
The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not
be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid
or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any
bankruptcy or insolvency law.
" Huskey v. Batts, 530 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974), citing Brown v. Brown, 32
Ohio App. 2d 139, 288 N.E.2d 852 (1972); cf. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)
(support claims are not affected by a general discharge in bankruptcy).
I" Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Operating Engineers Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky,
470 F. Supp. 1174 (D. Ariz. 1979); Senco, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979);
Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc. 2d 406,
402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1978); M.H. v. J.H., 93 Misc. 2d 1016, 403 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Family
Ct. 1978); Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 93 Misc. 2d 784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Family Ct. 1978);
Magrini v. Magrini, - Pa. Super. Ct. _, 398 A.2d 179 (1979).
0, General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976). The court
simply held that ERISA § 206(d) prevented the garnishment, and it did not even mention
the common law exception for alimony and support.
M' S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S563 (1979).
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benefits to her husband commence. Some years later H marries W.
Later still, W divorces H and obtains an alimony judgment against
him. May this judgment be satisfied out of H's interest in the pen-
sion plan? It is at least arguable, in view of the language in ERISA
§ 2,111 that a distinction ought to be made between claimants who
are "beneficiaries" of the participant and those who are not; with
the result that W, not being a natural object of E's bounty, would
have no claim against H's pension, while any children of H (by his
marriage with E) would have such a claim. But it has not been
suggested that the claims of spouses and dependent children be
accorded special treatment because of the status of those persons as
"beneficiaries" within the meaning of ERISA § 2. Indeed, ERISA
defines "beneficiary" to mean anyone whom the participant or plan
so designates; the term is in no way limited to dependents."2 Rather,
support claims of spouses and children are given special treatment
because of the public policy reasons previously set forth herein.
Accordingly, and in view of the language in both ERISA § 206(d)
and I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) which refers only to "benefits provided
under the plan" and makes no distinction between benefits payable
to the participant (E) and benefits payable to the participant's
beneficiary (H), the better view is that H's dependents ought to be
able to garnish H's pension regardless of their relation to E.
How is state community property law affected by ERISA §§
206(d) and 514? Specifically, when a couple obtains a divorce and
their community property is divided,13 how should the court treat
a spouse's interest in a pension plan attributable to his employment
during marriage? Some courts ordinarily divide community prop-
erty on an item-by-item basis, giving each spouse a fractional inter-
est in each asset."4 Clearly, such division of a spouse's accrued
pension benefit would constitute an alienation within the meaning
of the section 206(d) prohibition."' On the other hand, some courts
"I ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)(1976) provides in part: "It is hereby declared to be
the policy of this chapter to protect ... the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries . ... '
1t2 ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1976) provides that for purposes of Title I of ERISA,
"[t]he term 'beneficiary' means a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an
employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder."
ll3 See generally W. REPPY, JR. & W. DE FuNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNIrED STATES
464 (1975).
4 See In re Marriage of Brigden, 80 Cal. App. 3d 380, 145 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1978).
,' In Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765 (1970), it was held
that community property claims were not barred by a stat statutory provision analogous to
ERISA § 206(d), on the theory that a nonemployee spouse's interest in community assets is
an ownership interest, rather than an interest as creditor or assignee. "[R]ecognition of an
ownership claim cannot be described as the levy of execution, garnishment, attachment or
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divide community property on an aggregate basis, awarding to each
spouse whole community assets having a total value of one-half the
community (e.g., the house to the wife and the pension to the hus-
band)."' Such aggregating of the pension ought nonetheless to be
regarded as an alienation, albeit by indirect means, since it does
deprive a participant of the enjoyment or benefit of part of that
pension."7
Having determined that the enforcement upon divorce of com-
munity property rights in a pension constitutes an alienation within
the meaning of ERISA § 206(d), we must now inquire whether such
alienation is in fact barred by ERISA. The leading case is Stone v.
Stone."8 In a long and thoughtful opinion, the court held that sec-
assignment of property." Id. at 44, 473 P.2d at 772. This bit of sophistry was properly rejected
in Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 925-26 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313
(9th Cir. June 21, 1978).
" See Knickerbocker v. Knickerbocker, 43 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 118 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1974).
'7 Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) held that the, anti-assignment provision
in the Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976), barred the state court from
considering the husband's expected retirement benefits as part of the aggregate to be divided.
Accord, Hetrick v. Reading Co., 39 F, Supp. 22 (D.N.J. 1941). The provision reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State, territory,
or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assign-
able or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal
process under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be
anticipated ....
To be sure, the Supreme Court laid stress on the presence in the statute of the word
"anticipated": a word that does not appear in ERISA § 206(d) or I.R.C. § 401(a)(13), and a
word the Court regarded as uniquely applicable to this aggregate approach to dividing com-
munity property. But it is submitted that the Court's emphasis on this word was misplaced,
since it has long been held that no particular form of words is needed to create a spendthrift
trust. Kelley v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 235 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Pacific Guano Co. v. Weller
(In re De Lano's Estate), 62 Cal. App. 2d 808, 145 P.2d 672 (1944); Kirkland v. Mercantile-
Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 218 Md. 17, 145 A.2d 230 (1958); Ewalt v. Davenhill, 257 Pa.
385, 101 A. 756 (1917). And a spendthrift clause that expressly bars only voluntary alienations
will be held nonetheless to bar involuntary alienations as well. Roberts v. Stevens, 84 Me.
325, 24 A. 873 (1892); Partridge v. Cavender, 96 Mo. 452, 9 S.W. 785 (1888); Winthrop Co. v.
Clinton, 196 Pa. 472, 46 A. 435 (1900). Contra, Koelliker v. Denkinger, 148 Kan. 503, 83 P.2d
703, modified on other grounds, 149 Kan. 259, 86 P.2d 740 (1938). Indeed, the Treasury
Regulation interpreting ERISA's anti-assignment provision includes anticipation among the
enumerated prohibited transfers. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1978).
If the employee spouse's interest in the pension plan is not fully vested at the time the
community property must be divided (that is, if his interest under the plan is subject to
forfeiture in the event his employment terminates prior to the completion of a specified period
of service), the aggregate approach to property division may yield unfair results unless both
spouses are made to bear equally the risk of such future forfeiture. For an excellent discussion
of this issue, see Note, Dividing the Community Property Interest in Nonvested Pension
Rights, in Survey, The Supreme Court of California 1975-1976, 65 CAL. L. Rav. 231, 275
(1977).
"1 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978); accord, Johnston v. Johnston (In re Marriage of
Johnston), 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 910, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798, 805 (1978), cert denied, 48 U.S.L.W.
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tion 206(d) did not bar a nonemployee spouse from asserting her
community property rights in her husband's pension, on the ground
that ERISA was designed to protect the family unit-the type of
argument we have already discussed.'9 In addition, the court held
that the preemption provision of section 514 did not preempt state
community property laws. This portion of the opinion is less per-
suasive, since the court was able to advance only these two rather
weak arguments in support of this second conclusion. First, if the
provision of ERISA that deals specifically with alienations (section
206(d)) permits the enforcement of community property claims, the
more general provision (section 514) should not be construed as
forbidding it; and second, the Supreme Court has held that "the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress." 20
Carpenters Pension Trust for Southern California v.
Kronschnabel'2' reached the same result as Stone but went consider-
ably further by holding that state laws that affect merely the distri-
bution of vested pension benefits were not preempted by section 514
of ERISA. The court arrived at this surprising and erroneous12 con-
clusion by focusing on the following definition of "State" in section
514: "The term 'State' includes a State [or] any political subdivi-
sion thereof, . . .which purports to regulate . . .the terms and
conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this [title]."'23 The
court concluded that "[t]he phrase 'terms and conditions' pertains
to the plan's administration and operations, and does not relate to
whether the participant's benefits are to be distributed as com-
munity or separate property.' 24 Such a narrow construction of the
phrase seems entirely without foundation.
There is one case that denies a claim of a community property
interest in a pension plan. Francis v. United Technologies Corp. ,'2
3452 (1980) (No. 78-1445); Johns v. Retirement Fund of the Plumbing, Heating & Piping
Industry, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3447 (1980) (No. 78-1422).
"I See notes 99-107 & accompanying text supra.
'12 Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 932, citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947).
121 460 F. Supp. 978 (C.D. Cal. 1978); accord, In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d
113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979), appeal dismissed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3451 (1980) (No. 78-1881).
122 See notes 35-38 & accompanying text supra.
212 460 F. Supp. 978, 980 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (emphasis in original). The definition of "State"
appears in ERISA § 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1976).
12 460 F. Supp. 978, 981 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
212 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978). In Thompson v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 450 F. Supp.
197, 199-200 (W.D. Tex. 1978), the court expressly declined to decide the issue, but instead
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decided by the same court (but not the same judge) that decided
Stone, simply disagreed with Stone and held that "ERISA has
preempted the operation of so much of California's community
property laws as purport to give a non-employee spouse an interest
in the plan benefits."'' 6
Stone is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, 2 7 and in that
appeal the Department of Labor has filed an amicus briefr 28 arguing
that ERISA preempts California's community property law, but
that there is an implied exception to ERISA's anti-assignment rule
that would permit the recognition of community property rights in
accrued pension benefits upon divorce. This seemingly self-
contradictory resolution is actually most sensible. We have already
seen that federal preemption of state laws relating to employee
plans is intended to be sweeping, 19 and there can be no doubt that
community property law does indeed "relate" to employee plans
within the meaning of ERISA § 514. Community property law
grants to each spouse certain rights to manage and dispose of com-
munity assets, 30 and these rights, when accorded the nonemployee
spouse, may be inconsistent with rights that ERISA guarantees to
the employee alone. For example, ERISA § 205's' provides that if a
pension plan offers retirement benefits in the form of an annuity,
the employee must be given the opportunity to elect to receive his
benefit in the form of a joint and survivor annuity with his spouse.
Thus, if the normal form of retirement benefit to which an employee
would be entitled is $100 per month for his life, he must be given
the right to elect to receive that benefit in the form of an annuity
of, say, eighty dollars per month for his life, and after his death forty
dollars per month to his wife for her life. Obviously, the wife's views
remanded the case to state court as having been improperly removed. In dictum, however,
the court asserted, without discussion, that ERISA barred any community property claims
in the employee's pension.
21 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
J" 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978).
1 The brief has been published in [1979] PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 221 at R-7.
iz See text at notes 35-38, supra. It is worth noting that the same judge who decided Stone,
Judge Renfrew, had earlier handed down two decisions that may represent the most sweeping
view of ERISA's preemption provision ever judicially adopted: Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud,
442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1095 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1978);
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affl'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert.- denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1979).
"I See, e.g., 9 Amz. Rav. STAT. § 25-214 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1979);
6 IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (Supp. 1978); 9A LA. CIv. CODE ANN. 2404 (1971); 5 NEv. Rav. STAT. §
123.230 (1973); 8 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4A-8 (1975); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (1975); 26
WASH. RE v. CODE § 16.030 (1961).
131 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976).
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on how the employee ought to exercise his right of election might
be at variance with those of her husband, so that to permit her to
exercise the management rights in the pension that community
property law would ordinarily accord her would interfere with the
husband's section 205 rights. 3 1 Similarly, to permit the wife, should
she predecease her husband, to exercise the normal community
property power to dispose by will of half the community interest in
the accrued pension benefit free of the husband's control 33 would
sharply conflict with other rights given the husband by ERISA.'3 1
There are, however, two objectionsthat might be raised to the
conclusion that section 514 preempts community property law.
First, in construing federal statutory preemption provisions, courts
generally observe that "the basic police powers of the States, partic-
ularly the regulation of domestic relations, are not superseded by
federal legislation, unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress. '' 35 One might therefore argue that since Congress ex-
pressly preempted community property law in connection with cer-
tain ERISA provisions, 3 its failure to do so in section 514 suggests
that courts ought to be most chary of reading into section 514 an
intent to preempt community property law.
The second and more persuasive argument relates to employee
contributions. Suppose an employee contributes part of his salary
to a pension plan. If he is married at the time such salary is earned,
the salary constitutes community property; 3 yet once contributed
to the plan, that money and any benefits attributable thereto be-
132 The Supreme Court of California has held that the nonemployee spouse has no power
to manage the pension plan interest, even though that interest constitutes community prop-
erty. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 849-50, 544 P.2d 561, 568 (1976). Search has
revealed no comparable holdings in the other community property jurisdictions.
133 See generally 1 W. PAGE, WILLS § 16.9 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1960).
3I See ERISA § -203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976).
'1' Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)); see United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68,
77 (1904).
"I Section 2002(a)(1) of ERISA added § 219(c)(2) to the Internal Revenue Code, which
provides that for purposes of computing the maximum amount that an individual may deduct
for contributions to an individual retirement account, community property law is to be
disregarded. It should be noted, however, that ERISA § 2002(a)(1) is to be found in Title 11
of the statute, while the preemption provision of § 514 states only that the provisions of Title
I preempt state law. Consequently, one ought not to infer from the presence of a specific
reference in Title II to community property and the absence of such a reference in Title I a
congressional intent to except community property from the general preemption provision of
§ 514.
I3? See, e.g., Shaw v. Greer, 67 Ariz. 223, 194 P.2d 430 (1948); Colagrossi v. Hendrickson,
50 Wash. 2d 266, 310 P.2d 1072 (1957).
[Vol. 55:247
come subject to the employee's right of election under section 205,
which right, as we have seen, is conferred by ERISA upon the em-
ployee alone. If it is held that ERISA preempts the nonemployee
spouse's right to participate in the section 205 decision, then in
effect the employee has the power to appropriate community prop-
erty from his wife and place it in an arrangement beyond her powers
of management.'38 But the United States Supreme Court seems to
have disposed of this very objection in Wissner v. Wissner. 39 There,
a husband used his army wages, earned while married and therefore
held to be community property, to pay the premiums on a life insur-
ance policy on his own life issued pursuant to the National Service
Life Insurance Act of 1940 (NSLIA),110 and he designated his mother
as beneficiary under the policy. Upon the insured's death his wife
claimed one-half the policy proceeds, in accordance with normal
principles of California community property law.' The Supreme
Court denied her claim, holding that her community property rights
in the proceeds were preempted by a provision of the NSLIA to the
effect that
[t]he insured shall have the right to designate the beneficiary
or beneficiaries of insurance ... and shall ... at all times have
the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries.'
The Wissner case has not gone without criticism,' and there was
a vigorous, though brief, dissent by Justice Minton in which Jus-
tices Frankfurter and Jackson joined. But to hold that ERISA does
not preempt community property law would frustrate Congress'
goal of a uniform federal law of pensions, because the community
property rights otherwise accorded the nonemployee spouse are ex-
tensive and may vary considerably from state to state. Furthermore,
the Wissner principle was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, '" though the latter presented a some-
what easier case in view of the statutory language before the Court.
Hisquierdo involved a divorced California wife claiming an inter-
est, under community property law, in her former husband's expect-
ancy in a pension to be paid pursuant to the Railroad Retirement
lu See generally W. DE FuNiAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 119-
23 (2d ed. 1971).
131 338 U.S. 655 (1950); accord, Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964) (United States
Savings Bonds); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (same).
, 38 U.S.C. §§ 701-788 (1976).
' See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 P. 61 (1923).
142 338 U.S. 655, 658-59 (1950) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1976)).
"' E.g., W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 138, at § 123.
"' 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
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Act of 1974 (RRA). The Act provides a statutory benefit for an
employee's spouse but states that such benefit or any right thereto
terminates when the spouse and the employee are divorced.'46 The
Act also contains a spendthrift provision, '47 to which an exception
was later made permitting the retirement benefits to be reached to
satisfy a legal obligation for child support or alimony.' Two years
after this exception was enacted, however, Congress reexamined the
statute and defined "alimony" to exclude
any payment or transfer of property or its value by an individual
to his spouse or former spouse in compliance with any com-
munity property settlement, equitable distribution of property,
or other division of property between spouses or former
spouses. 4'
In view of the statute's language and history, the conclusion of
Hisquierdo that the wife could not claim a community property
interest in her former husband's railroad pension expectancy seems
almost inescapable. But does it necessarily follow that the result
must be the same for an ordinary private pension covered by
ERISA?
The Court explicitly declined to express an opinion on this issue,
but made the following observation in a footnote:
In this case, Congress has granted a separate spouse's benefit,
and has terminated that benefit upon absolute divorce. Differ-
ent considerations might well apply where Congress has re-
mained silent on the subject of benefits for spouses, particularly
when the pension program is a private one which federal law
merely regulates. See Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974. . . . Our holding intimates no view concerning the
application of community property principles to benefits paya-
ble under programs that possess these distinctive characteris-
tics. ,50
There is certainly at least a faint implication here that the Court
would reach a different result under ERISA from that reached under
the RRA. But it must be remembered that what we are proposing
is a two-part conclusion to the question of a nonemployee spouse's
community property rights in an employee's pension: first, that
45 U.S.C. § 231 et seq. (1976).
2,8 45 U.S.C. § 231d(c)(3) (1976).
147 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976). The provision is quoted at note 117 supra.
I' 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976). This provision was enacted in 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a),
88 Stat. 2357.
,' Pub. L. No. 95-30, Tit. V, § 501(d), 91 Stat. 160.
' Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 n.24 (1979).
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ERISA preempts state community property law; and second, that
notwithstanding such preemption, the nonemployee spouse may
assert community property rights against the pension plan upon
divorce to obtain her community property share of the pension. The
Court has distinguished ERISA pensions from RRA pensions on the
ground that the RRA provides a specific statutory benefit for em-
ployees' spouses while ERISA does not. This distinction does not
relate to the broader question of whether ERISA preempts com-
munity property law generally; but it does afford a basis of distin-
guishing ERISA and RRA insofar as they affect the right of a
nonemployee spouse to assert claims against retirement benefits
upon divorce. ERISA could not have been intended to deny a di-
vorcing community property spouse rights which it has preserved for
divorcing common law property spouses. Because, as the Hisquierdo
footnote observes, ERISA does not provide a statutory spouse's ben-
efit that would suggest that the spouse should have no other interest
in the plan upon divorce, logic requires the conclusion that, notwith-
standing ERISA's preemption of community property law generally,
the nonemployee spouse may still look to the employee spouse's
pension to satisfy community property claims upon divorce.
The Javits bill' would codify this two-part conclusion in a neat
and sensible manner. Under the bill, a state court, in adjudicating
marital property rights upon divorce in a community property juris-
diction, may use the employee spouse's pension as a source of funds
with which to satisfy the other spouse's marital property claims to
the same extent the court could do so in the absence of ERISA,
provided (and this proviso is included in the bill presumably to
protect the preemption interests discussed above') that the plan is
not required "to alter the effective date, timing, form, duration, or
amount of any benefit payments under the plan or to honor any
election which is not provided for under the plan or which is made
by a person other than a participant or beneficiary."'5 3 In view of
our earlier discussion, however, it is evident that a court even now
could arrive at this two-part conclusion purely as a matter of statu-
tory construction, regardless of the fate of the Javits bill.
Tax Claims
Under the common law, government claims against the benefici-
ary of a trust for unpaid taxes may be enforced against his interest
's' ERISA Improvements Act of 1979, S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
222 See notes 130-34 & accompanying text supra.
'5 S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 128 (1979).
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in the trust notwithstanding a trust provision purporting to prohibit
assignments or alienations; 5' that is true whether or not the tax
liability arises out of the trust. Some courts have reached this result
on public policy grounds:
The reasons which have actuated some courts . . . to uphold
spendthrift trusts against the claims of creditors do not neces-
sarily apply to tax claims of the government either federal or
State. . . . The public policy involved is quite different. In the
one case the donor of the property has the right to protect the
beneficiary against his own voluntary improvident [sic] or fin-
ancial misfortune; but in the other the public interest is directly
affected with respect to collection of taxes for the support of the
government. The imposition of the tax burden is not voluntary
by the beneficiary. In a sense the property itself incurs the tax;
or rather the property is held cum onere. 5
Where federal taxes are concerned, others have reached the same
result on the basis of the Supremacy Clause.' 6 They argue that any
exemption which might otherwise arise from the presence of
spendthrift language in a trust instrument is a creature of state law
and must therefore yield to sections 6321 and 7403 of the Internal
Revenue Code, the former giving the United States a lien upon the
property of the taxpayer for unpaid taxes and the latter providing
for the enforcement of such lien. 157
May either a state or the federal government enforce a claim for
unpaid taxes against a participant's interest in a pension plan? In
view of ERISA § 514(d), which provides that "[niothing in this
title shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law of the United States. . . ," sections 6321 and
7403 of the Internal Revenue Code should continue to operate as
before and allow the federal government to enforce its tax claims
against the pension plan. The Treasury Regulation confirms this
'5' 2 A. Scorr, supra note 20, at § 157.4; G. BOGERT, supra note 4, at § 224 n.49. Curiously,
when the government's claim is not one for unpaid taxes, it will frequently be unable to reach
an interest under a spendthrift trust. See, e.g., McElhany v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 286
(1944) (collection of fine); State v. Caldwell, 181 Tenn. 74, 178 S.W.2d 624 (1944) (contract
claim).
'" Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert, 58 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D. Md. 1944) (citation omit-
ted).
15 Leuschner v. First Western Bank and Trust Co., 261 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1958); United
States v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 152 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1945); Jackson v. D'Aubin, 316 So. 2d
478 (La. App. 1975), aff'd, 338 So. 2d 575 (1976); cf. Fried v. New York Life Ins. Co., 241
F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957) (proceeds of disability insurance that
are, pursuant to state law, exempt from claims of creditors are not exempt from federal tax
liens).
' United States v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 152 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1945).
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view.' 8 As to state taxes, however, the result is less clear, and the
regulation is silent on the point.' It is submitted, however, that a
state should not be permitted to levy execution upon the pension
plan interest.
Consider the case of Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board.'
Pursuant to New Jersey law, the debtor, as a condition of receiving
state disability assistance, signed an agreement to reimburse the
Board for these disability payments should he later acquire any
assets of his own. Some years later the debtor began receiving Social
Security disability payments, which he deposited in a bank in the
name of Doris Philpott as trustee. The Social Security Act contains
a spendthrift provision applicable to all benefits.1"' The case arose
on an order to show cause why a judgment should not be entered in
favor of the Board, directing the bank to turn over to the Board
these monies on deposit. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that the federal exemption statute did not bar the Board's claim.'62
On writ of certiorari a unanimous United States Supreme Court, in
a brief opinion by Justice Douglas, reversed the New Jersey cburt
simply on the authority of the Supremacy Clause."3
Because ERISA, like the Social Security Act, contains a spend-
thrift provision, the Philpott case suggests that a state may not
attach the assets in an ERISA-covered pension plan to enforce a
judgment for unpaid taxes. Indeed, the case for barring such state
action is even stronger under ERISA than under the Social Security
Act, since the former contains an express provision preempting state
law whereas the latter statute does not. Furthermore, Congress had
been alerted to the problem of the preemption provision's effect
upon state tax law. While considering the House and Senate ver-
sions of the bill that eventually became ERISA, the conference com-
mittee received a suggested modification in the preemption provi-
sion that was submitted jointly by the Secretaries of Labor and
'M Tress. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b)(2) (1978) provides: "A plan provision satisfying the require-
ments of [the ERISA spendthrift provision] shall not preclude the following: (i) The enforce-
ment of a Federal tax levy made pursuant to section 6331. (ii) The collection by the United
States on a judgment resulting from an unpaid tax assessment." For the explanation of why
only Treasury regulations, rather than Labor Department regulations, have been promul-
gated to construe the ERISA spendthrift provision, see note 13 supra.
' There is a negative pregnant in the regulation from which one might infer that the state
may not, in the opinion of the Service, enforce its claims for taxes against a pension plan.
409 U.S. 413 (1973).
262 See note 106 supra. As a matter of general common law claims by a state for reimburse-
ment of welfare payments are generally enforceable against any interest the welfare recipient
might have in a spendthrift trust. See 2 A. ScoTT, supra note 20, at § 157.2.
1,2 Essex County Welfare Bd. v. Philpott, 59 N.J. 75, 279 A.2d 806 (1971).
10 Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973).
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Treasury. The proposal read in part: "Notwithstanding the provi-
sions of this section, a State shall have the authority to prescribe
rules and regulations governing the tax qualification and taxation
of contributions, distributions or income, of an employee pension
plan."' 64 Yet when Congress finally enacted ERISA, though cogni-
zant of the problem of state tax law, it chose to exempt from the
statute's broad preemption of state law only insurance, securities,
banking, and generally-applicable criminal law.' 5
May the state subject pension payments to income tax once those
payments have been received? Spendthrift provisions are held not
to preclude execution once the trust income is in the hands of the
beneficiary,' 6 so presumably ERISA § 206(d) is not violated by such
taxation.'67 But what about ERISA § 514? Would such income taxa-
tion be preempted on the ground that it "relates" to a covered
employee benefit plan? The only case in point at this writing is
National Carriers' Conference Committee v. Heffernan.'65 The case
involved a dental reimbursement plan, which constitutes an
"eitployee welfare benefit plan" within the meaning of ERISA' 19
and which, like a pension plan, is subject to the preemption provi-
sion of ERISA § 514. Connecticut had enacted a tax that required
any entity maintaining an emplbyee welfare plan to pay a tax of
2.75% of "the amounts paid as benefits to or on behalf of residents
of" Connecticut.' The court held that the tax was preempted by
ERISA § 514 but made the following crucial observation:
The statute is not merely a general taxing provision that catches
employee benefit plans within its wide sweep. On the contrary,
the tax is specifically directed at such plans exclusively, and is
' Administration Recommendations to the House and Senate Conferees on H.R. 2 to
Provide for Pension Reform (April, 1974), reprinted in 3 SuBCOMMrrTEE ON LABOR OF THE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PuBIc WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURrrY AcT OF 1974, at 5050, 5147 (1976).
'5 ERISA §§ 514(b)(2)(A), 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A), 1144(b)(4) (1976).
"1 2 A. SCoTr, supra note 20, at § 152.5. The statutory spendthrift provision before the
court in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413 (1973) (see note 160 supra)
was unusually sweeping in that it purported (and was held by the court) to bar the attach-
ment of moneys already paid out, at least until those moneys were placed in some sort of
"permanent investment" and were no longer "readily withdrawable" by the recipient.
,,7 The Treasury Regulation provides that the spendthrift language required by ERISA
does not preclude the withholding of any federal, state or local tax from benefit payments.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(2)(ii) (1978). However reasonable this exception may seem as a
matter of policy, it would appear to be invalid as regards state and local tax withholding.
Such withholding constitutes an alienation which is barred by ERISA § 206(d), 29 U.S.C. §
1056(d) (1976).
' 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978).
' ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-212c (Supp. 1979).
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distinct from the tax applied to insurance company prem-
iums. . . .Clearly it "relates to" ERISA-covered plans.'
In support of its conclusion that the tax was preempted by ERISA,
the court went on to point out that the tax had a regulatory side-
effect: that since Connecticut imposed a 2.75% tax on inter vivos
welfare plan benefits while imposing a tax of only 2% on the prem-
iums received by domestic insurance companies,"'7 the tax structure
might operate as an incentive for employers to use insurance rather
than trusts to fund welfare plans.7 3 Because state taxes can be a
means of regulation, the court ruled that "preempting state taxa-
tion of ERISA-covered plans is necessary to effectuate Congres-
sional objective."'' But it should follow from this decision that a
generally-applicable state tax that does not treat ERISA-covered
plans specially does not "relate to" those plans within the meaning
of ERISA § 514 and, consequently, is not preempted.'75
STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS
ERISA provides at least two exceptions to the general rule that
the benefits under a covered pension plan may not be assigned or
alienated: (1) voluntary and revocable assignments; and (2) use of
accrued benefits as security for loans.
Voluntary and Revocable Assignments
Section 206(d) of ERISA provides that, notwithstanding the gen-
eral required spendthrift provision, a plan may permit "voluntary
and revocable" assignments by a participant of not more than ten
percent of any benefit payment, provided that the assignment is not
"made for purposes of defraying plan administration costs," and a
" 454 F.Supp. 914, 915 (D. Conn. 1978) (citation omitted).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-202 (1972).
n Welfare plan benefits are exempt from the 2.75% tax to the extent they are "insured by
an insurance company." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-212b(1) (Supp. 1979).
n, 454 F. Supp. at 918.
"7 Many states, following the lead of the federal government, exempt pension trusts from
the state income tax if, but only if, the trusts comply with certain requirements similar to
the qualification requirements of I.R.C. § 401(a). Such regulation of pension plans by means
of state tax law is presumably invalid as a consequence of ERISA § 514. Perhaps the state
tax scheme could be "saved" if, like that of Minnesota, it merely requires that plans and
trusts meet whatever requirements are imposed by federal law, see MINN. STAT. ANN. §
290.26(1) (1979). But even where the state regulatory scheme is identical with the federal,
the fact that the state tax scheme is regulatory in its intent could justifiably lead a court to
conclude that the tax scheme "relates to" pension plans and is therefore preempted. Further
congressional action on this issue is sorely needed.
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comparable exception is found in I.R.C. § 401(a)(13). Thus, if a
participant in pay status' is receiving a pension of $500 per month,
the plan may permit him to assign no more than $50 per month of
his benefit, provided the assignment is voluntary and revocable and
is not used to defray plan administration costs. This exception was
probably engendered by Congress' concern that certain check-off
arrangements would otherwise be imperiled. Suppose an employee
who reaches retirement wishes to continue his coverage under his
employer's medical insurance program. The employer will hardly
object but will presumably insist that the retiree pay the premiums
himself since he is no longer an employee. The insurer granted the
employer a favorable group rate at least in part because the insurer
did not have to look to each individual employee for premium pay-
ments, but rather needed to look only to the solvent employer. Typi-
cally, therefore, an employer might agree to pay the premiums for
the retiree, in order to satisfy the insurer's demand for a single
obligor, provided that the employer was reimbursed out of the em-
ployee's pension. In other words, if the employee's pension is $500
per month and the cost of his insurance coverage is $50 per month,
the employer would pay the $50 to the insurer, but the employee
would agree that $50 of his pension was to be paid to his employer.
Suppose, however, the amount which is thus paid to the employer
is more than ten percent of the benefit payment. Does that mean
that such a check-off arrangement will be barred by ERISA? Not
necessarily. When an obligee truly assigns his claim, the assignment
gives the assignee the right to bring an action against the obligor
directly.'7 7 It is this right that distinguishes a true assignment from
a mere authorization or power of attorney.' 78 Again, suppose that a
"I I.R.C. § 401(a) (13) indicates that the exception for voluntary and revocable assignments
applies only in the case of a "participant who is receiving benefits under the plan." The
exception as it appears in ERISA § 206(d) is not so limited. No explanation for this difference
is offered except that of careless legislative drafting. As a practical matter, however, it is
unlikely that a participant not in pay status would be in a position to avail himself of this
exception; a potential assignee would have little interest in a revocable assignment of a
benefit not yet payable.
Robinson v. City of Pine Bluff, 224 Ark. 791, 276 S.W.2d 419 (1955); Guaranty Deposit
Bank v. Reedy, 272 S.W.2d 341 (Ky. 1954); A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 905 (1951).
In the overwhelming majority of states there are "real party in interest" statutes which
permit or require an assignee to sue in his own name rather than that of the assignor. E.g.,
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 367 (West 1973); ILL, ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 22 (1968). For a detailed
listing of such statutes and court rules, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 7,
statutory note p. 321. See generally A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 856 (1952); Williston, Is the Right
of an Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?, 30 HARv. L. REv. 97 (1916).
"I For example, in Piedmont S. Life Ins. Co. v. Gunter, 108 Ga. App. 236, 132 S.E.2d 527
(1963), plaintiff was covered by group medical insurance provided by her employer, and she
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participant is receiving a pension of $500 per month payable on the
fifth day of each month, but he wishes to continue to be covered by
an employer's medical program, the cost of which is $60 per month.
An arrangement is entered into whereby the trustee of the pension
plan will pay $60 of that payment to the employer and only $440 to
the participant. The participant reserves the power to revoke the
arrangement with the pension plan at any time, provided he gives
the trustee one week's notice of the revocation. The participant
revokes the authorization on June 2, to be effective immediately.
Since the trustee has not been given a week's notice with respect to
the June 5 payment, he ought to pay that $60 to the employer, but
suppose he does not. Under the arrangement, may the employer
bring an action against the trustee directly, or is the employer lim-
ited to an action against the participant? If the employer could sue
the plan directly, then the arrangement, however revocable it might
be, is an assignment and is barred by ERISA since the amount
exceeds ten percent of the benefit payment. But if the employer's
remedy is limited to a suit against the employee, the arrangement
is not an assignment and therefore ERISA is not violated. Indeed,
even if the arrangement were irrevocable, so long as the employer's
remedy for nonpayment is against the participant and not against
the plan, there is no assignment, '79 and consequently there is no
violation of ERISA.,
This distinction between an assignment and a mere authorization
sued to collect benefits due her. The doctor and hospital who had performed the services
intervened as parties plaintiff on the basis of a document signed by the.insured employee
whereby she purported to assign to the doctor and hospital her right to reimbursement from
the insurance company for medical expenses incurred. The court held that the employee did
not intend an actual assignment of the indebtedness, but rather merely a power of attorney
authorizing the insurance company to pay benefits directly to the doctor and hospital. Ac-
cordingly, the court ruled that it was error to allow the intervention, and it reversed the
verdict that had been rendered in favor of the intervenors.
[Al gratuitous assignment [of his interest by the beneficiary of a spendthrift
trust] is ineffective to transfer his interest. The assignment would operate,
however, as a revocable authorization to the trustee to pay to the assignee the
income as it accrues, and to the extent that such accrued income is paid to the
assignee before revocation by the beneficiary, the trustee is protected in making
the payment and the assignee can keep the amounts so paid to him. Even if the
assignee pays value for the assignment, the assignment is ineffective as a trans-
fer of the beneficial interest, and the beneficiary can at any time revoke it. It
seems clear, however, that if the beneficiary revokes the assignment, the as-
signee is entitled to recover the amount which he paid for the assignment on
the ground that there is a failure of consideration. He thereby becomes a creditor
of the beneficiary for the amount so paid . . . .
2 A. Scorr, supra note 20, at § 152.3 (footnote omitted). Accord, E. GRISwOLD, supra note
58, at § 306. See also In re Goldman's Estate, 142 Misc. 790, 255 N.Y.S. 533 (Sur. Ct. 1932);
Note, Reaching a Beneficiary's Interest in a Trust Fund, 3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 326 (1952).
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appears to have been adopted by the regulation issued under I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(13), which provides in part as follows:
For purposes of this section, the terms "assignment" and
"alienation" include-
(i) Any arrangement providing for the payment to the em-
ployer of plan benefits which otherwise would be due the partici-
pant under the plan, and
(ii) Any direct or indirect arrangement (whether revocable or
irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a participant or ben-
eficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to,
all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may
become, payable to the participant or beneficiary. 8 '
Subdivision (ii) of the above provision makes the sort of distinction
just discussed, but the presence in the regulation of subdivision (i)
suggests that if the employer is the party in whose favor the authori-
zation is made, the authorization constitutes an assignment regard-
less of whether the employer would have the right to proceed di-
rectly against the plan. If that is the intendment of subdivision (i),
the provision is at variance with the law. 8'
The word "voluntary" in this statutory exception is plainly in-
tended to exclude garnishments or levies, as the Regulation states,"2
but this obvious fact was evidently lost on the New York Supreme
Court in IBEW Local 3 where it held, although neither party had
raised the issue at trial, that the judgment creditor of a plan partici-
pant could, pursuant to this exception, attach up to ten percent of
the participant's pension.1 3
Pledges as Security for Loans
Section 206(d) of ERISA also provides:
[A] loan made to a participant or beneficiary shall not be
treated as an assignment or alienation if such loan is secured by
the participant's accrued nonforfeitable benefit and is exempt
from the tax imposed by section 4975 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (relating to tax on prohibited transactions) by
reason of section 4975(d)(1) of such Code.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1) (1978).
Conceivably, the Service included subdivision (i) to prevent employers from pressuring
employees into making "authorizations" of benefit payments in the employers' favor. If that
was the purpose of the subdivision, such a preventive is unnecessary in view of ERISA §§
510 & 511, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140 & 1141 (1976), which provide sanctions in the case of interference
on the part of any person with the rights guaranteed to participants by ERISA.
l 2 Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(d)(1) (1978); see note 28 supra.
W* ilkins v. Conroy, 179 N.Y.L.J. No. 73, at 16, April 17, 1978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); see
National Bank of N. America v. IBEW Local 3, 69 App. Div. 2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979).
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An identical provision appears in I.R.C. § 401(a)(13). The exception
is inaptly worded. Obviously, it is not the loan that would otherwise
constitute the alienation but rather the granting of a security inter-
est. The reference to I.R.C. § 4975 is also inaptly phrased. Only
qualified plans may, by reason of I.R.C. § 4975(d)(1), be exempted
from the section 4975 tax; 184 a nonqualified plan (and ERISA §
206(d) applies to nonqualified as well as qualified plans) is not
subject to the tax at all and therefore is not exempted from it "by
reason of" section 4975(d)(1). Similarly, only loans to "disqualified
persons"'" can be subject to the section 4975 tax, so if the partici-
pant who borrows is not a disqualified person, the loan would not
be exempt "by reason of" section 4975(d)(1). The last sentence of
ERISA § 206(d) and the corresponding provision in I.R.C. §
401(a)(13) should therefore be "translated":
Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph a partici-
pant may grant a security interest in his accrued vested benefit
as security for a loan, provided that:
(1) if the plan is qualified and the participant is a disquali-
fied person, the loan is exempt from the section 4975 excise tax
by reason of section 4975(d)(1); and
(2) if the plan is not qualified or if the participant is not a
disqualified person, the loan would have been exempt from the
section 4975 excise tax by reason of section 4975(d)(1) had the
plan been qualified and the participant a disqualified person.
When the Internal Revenue Service issued proposed regulations
under this section on December 28, 1976, it took the position that
this exception applied only when the lender was the plan itself.188
There was an immediate negative reaction. 17 On April 15, 1977, the
Service held a public hearing on the proposal at which numerous
persons testified that frequently an employee was unable to obtain
credit unless he could offer his accrued pension benefits as collat-
eral, and that as a consequence of the enactment of the ERISA anti-
assignment provision and the Service's proposed restrictive inter-
pretation of the exception thereto, employees were often making
outright withdrawals from their pension plan interests (even when
substantial penalties were imposed under the plan on account of
M I.R.C. § 4975 imposes a penalty excise tax on persons who engage in certain prohibited
types of self-dealing with respect to the assets or sponsors of a qualified plan.
' The term "disqualified person" is defined in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2).
'' Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b), 41 Fed. Reg. 56335 (1976).
' Actually, the negative reaction began somewhat earlier, since, on December 3, 1975, the
Service had issued Technical Information Release 1422, which announced that "Regulations
to be prescribed under section 401(a)(13) will provide that the . . . exception is applicable
only to loans from the plan and not to loans from third parties."
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such withdrawals) to make purchases that they would otherwise
have made with borrowed funds. '
It is evident that the objections raised at the hearing strike at the
whole theory behind ERISA § 206(d) and not just at the Service's
construction of a statutory exception. There is a bit of paternalism
inherent in section 206(d). It reflects Congress' apparent view that
an employee is not equipped to make the choice between enjoying
funds now (say, for educational expenses for his children) and set-
ting aside the funds to enjoy later (for retirement), and that Con-
gress must therefore make the choice for the employee by prohibit-
ing him from anticipating his pension plan interest to obtain current
enjoyment of the funds. The employee could, of course, if his plan
permits it, withdraw the moneys prior to retirement and use them
for education expenses; but once funds are withdrawn from the
plan, they may not ordinarily be recontributed,19 so the employee
would therefore have less money reaping the benefit of tax-free ac-
cretions. Thus, section 206(d), far from benefiting employees, may
actually do them a disservice by denying them the power to choose
between benefits now and benefits later and (by limiting their abil-
ity to borrow from the plan) obliging many employees to remove
funds from the plan prior to retirement-thereby interfering with
the very retirement saving that Congress sought to encourage. 90
But whether or not ERISA § 206(d) and I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) repre-
sent sound policy, so long as they remain the law, the Service's
interpretation of the loan exception is correct and is to be found in
the final regulation.' 1 The Service's view that the exception is avail-
able only when the lender is the plan itself finds support both in the
legislative history and in the statutory language itself. The confer-
ence committee report states with regard to the ERISA spendthrift
provision that "[v]ested benefits may be used as collateral for
reasonable loans from a plan, where the fiduciary requirements of
18 The hearing is summarized in [1977 New Developments Binder] PENSION PLAN GuwE
(CCH) 25,160.
" ' There are some exceptions. For example, if a plan provides that an employee who
withdraws his mandatory employee contributions from the plan forfeits the portion of his
accrued benefit attributable to employer contributions, the plan must also provide for the
repayment of such employee contributions and for the recrediting of the forfeited benefits
upon timely repayment. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(D) (1976); I.R.C. §
411(a)(3)(D). See also, ERISA § 204(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(d) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(7)(B) &
(C).
" At least one court has acknowledged that the "spendthrift" provision in the Social
Security law, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976), might digadvantage an elderly person by making it more
difficult for him to obtain credit. In re Estate of Vary, 401 Mich. 340, 349-50, 258 N.W.2d 11,
15 (1977).
"I Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(d)(2)(i) (1978).
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the law are not violated." 9 The reference in the statute to I.R.C. §
4975(d)(1) is also clear evidence that Congress intended that only
the plan would be the lender. Consider, a loan is not exempt from
the section 4975 excise tax by reason of section 4975(d)(1) unless
such loan "is available to all participants or beneficiaries on a rea-
sonably equivalent basis. . . [and] is not made available to highly
compensated employees, officers, or shareholders in an amount
greater than the amount made available to other employees. ' 93
Obviously, the plan trustee cannot hope to supervise and control the
lending policies of another institution. If the loan exception applied
to loans from third parties, the trustee could find himself in a diffi-
cult position. Suppose an employee of XYZ Company borrows
money from ABC Bank and gives the bank a security interest in his
vested accrued pension benefit. Subsequently, the employee de-
faults on the loan, and the bank attempts to foreclose upon the
pledged accrued benefit. Should the trustee abide the foreclosure or
should he oppose it? If the trustee does not oppose the foreclosure
and it is revealed that ABC Bank, shortly thereafter, made a loan
to the president of XYZ on terms more favorable than those offered
rank-and-file employees, the loan exception was not (it turns out)
available, and the plan could be required to make good the em-
ployee's loss if the employee brings an action against the plan pur-
suant to ERISA § 502(a) (1).' " This difficulty is avoided if the excep-
tion is limited to loans from the plan. Moreover, the Service's con-
struction of the loan exception is consistent with Congress' paternal-
istic frame of mind, since it is more likely that a plan trustee would
try to prevent an employee from overborrowing than would a third-
party lender.
CONCLUSION
ERISA requires that every pension plan contain a provision pro-
hibiting the assignment or alienation of plan benfits, and a new
federal common law of pension plans must be fashioned to interpret
this provision. The state common law of spendthrift trusts permits
creditors to levy upon spendthrift trust assets in certain exceptional
circumstances. The three most significant exceptions relate to: (1)
self-settled trusts, (2) claims for alimony and support, and (3) tax
2,2 H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 280, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5038, 5061 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
"I I.R.C. § 4975(d)(1)(A) & (B).
" 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1976).
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claims. It remains to be seen to what extent these traditional excep-
tions will be incorporated into the new federal common law of pen-
sion plans.
There has been no litigation definitively addressing in an ERISA
context the issue of the self-settled trust exception. The statute
leaves so many questions in this area unanswered, particularly
where self-employed individuals are concerned, that further legisla-
tive action is needed to clarify the law. As to the exception for
alimony and support claims, there has been a good deal of definitive
litigation, and the overwhelming majority of cases so far have held
that alimony and support claims may be satisfied out of the obli-
gor's interest in a pension plan. As of this writing, no case has
directly addressed the question of whether tax claims against a
participating employee may be enforced against his interest in a
pension plan. It is submitted that federal, but not state, tax claims
may be enforced against the taxpayer's pension plan interest. The
barring of state tax claims is probably not a result that Congress
intended, but in view of ERISA's broad preemption provision and
the manner in which similar provisions in other federal statutes
have been construed, further congressional action would be neces-
sary to enable states to enforce their tax claims against pension plan
interests.
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